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“The greatest boon which could be conferred on farmers and ditch-owners of
California would be relief from the anxiety and expense of litigation over water
rights.”—Elwood Mead, 1903 1
I. INTRODUCTION: THE END OF THE CALIFORNIA EXCEPTION IN GROUNDWATER
The rules of western water law obey western realities: this is a hallowed
maxim. Begin with the reality of the western climate. Its harshness and aridity
long ago dictated that western courts deviate from received common-law
principles of reasonable and equitable use and adopt the doctrine of prior
appropriation instead. 2 Move on to the West’s topography; it must be respected
so that it may be overcome. Because western rivers are often distant from good
farmland, water rights must be severable from their native riparian lands so that
water can be put to beneficial use on better soil downstream. 3 Finally, there is the
West’s pioneering legal culture. Because westerners mined before they farmed,
and because they have always understood the necessities imposed upon them by
aridity and topography, they have always embraced the legitimacy of the prior
appropriation doctrine. 4 Suspicious of corporate interests and land and water
monopolies, they wisely forbade speculation in and hoarding of water supplies. 5
These rules and realities are self-evident and mutually reinforcing. Even Mexican
irrigators bereft of the blessings of the common law recognized that rights to the
San Pedro were most definitely not like those to the Thames. 6
But California follows different rules than the rest of the West. That is
because California has its own natural realities, but also because California has
the power to create artificial realities all its own—realities that exist nowhere
else. California is thus an enduring insult to western conditions, to western
sensibilities, and especially to western agriculture. There is no place like the San
Joaquin Valley anywhere else in the West, much less the world. Acre for acre, it
raised more wheat than any other state in the country, including Kansas when

1. ELWOOD MEAD, IRRIGATION INSTITUTIONS: A DISCUSSION OF THE ECONOMIC AND LEGAL
QUESTIONS CREATED BY THE GROWTH OF IRRIGATED AGRICULTURE IN THE WEST 197 (1903).
2. Yunker v. Nichols, 1 Colo. 551, 553–54 (1872).
3. MEAD, supra note 1, at 169.
4. United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 704 (1899).
5. DAVID SCHORR, THE COLORADO DOCTRINE: WATER RIGHTS, CORPORATIONS AND DISTRIBUTIVE
JUSTICE ON THE AMERICAN FRONTIER 28–31 (2012).
6. Boquillas Land & Cattle Co. v. Curtis, 213 U.S. 339 (1909).
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Kansas was the “Wheat State.” 7 But because the valley is temperate and does not
suffer hard freezes, its farmers soon migrated to more valuable crops such as
vegetables, citrus, grapes, and berries. 8 It is now home to the most lucrative crops
grown in the United States—nut trees such as pistachios, almonds, and walnuts,
not to mention pomegranates. Unlike populist movements in states such as
Kansas, Nebraska, and the Dakotas, which banned or limited corporate
ownership of farmland, California has rarely scrupled about the power and
efficiency of corporate agriculture. It secured the Central Valley Project during
the 1930s to bring in water from as far away as Lake Shasta to the San Joaquin
River Basin. 9 Faced with the Reclamation Act’s quaint 160-acre limitation on
federal irrigation water, California bonded the State Water Plan and the
California Aqueduct to supply much larger farms. 10
Perhaps most exceptional of all, though, were the Central Valley’s
groundwater supplies: plentiful, easy to access, recharged by percolation from the
Coastal and Sierra Nevada Ranges, and wonderfully, intentionally, completely
unregulated. Groundwater was the Central Valley’s “ace-in-the hole,” freely
accessible during surface water restrictions. 11 So much for the sanctimony of
western courts, and of the “imperative necessity” of prior appropriation rights
which rise to the “dignity of a distinct usufructuary estate.” 12 Federal
Reclamation water, state project water, and landowner-controlled groundwater
together irrigate the Central Valley. For most of its 170-year-old history,
agriculture across California has exploited the state’s exceptional natural
bounties, employed an exceptional water-supply infrastructure for surface water,
and steadfastly maintained a glaring legal exception for the permitting and
regulation of groundwater.
That exception is ending. Global climate change has reduced California’s
greatest water resource, its Sierra Nevada snowpack. Global warming has
delayed snowfall to later in the winter and advanced snowmelt to earlier in the
spring, undercutting the assumptions of stationarity that were part of the design
of federal and state water infrastructure engineered nearly a century ago.
Reservoirs designed to capture and hold runoff through the summer months for
irrigation use must now regularly release early spring inflows to avoid flooding.13
Irrigators have also done their part. Over the past century they have over-pumped
the Central Valley Aquifer to such an extent that its geological substrates have

7. MARK ARAX, THE DREAMT LAND: CHASING WATER AND DUST ACROSS CALIFORNIA 181 (2019).
8. MEAD, supra note 1, at 180–83.
9. NORRIS HUNDLEY, JR., THE GREAT THIRST: CALIFORNIANS AND WATER: A HISTORY 247–76 (rev. ed.,
2001).
10. Id. at 276–91.
11. Joseph L. Sax, We Don’t Do Groundwater: A Morsel of California Legal History, 6 U. DENV.
WATER L. REV. 269, 270–71 (2003).
12. Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 446, 449 (1882).
13. PETER H. GLEICK, WATER: THE POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF CLIMATE VARIABILITY AND CHANGE
FOR WATER RESOURCES OF THE UNITED STATES 85 (2000).
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collapsed and subsided by over thirty feet in some areas—probably the largest
anthropogenic change in land-surface elevation in the world.14
Over-pumping during the long drought that began in 2006 reached its literal
breaking point during the 2010s, as land subsidence ruptured Central Valley
canals—a tragicomic case of conjunctive mismanagement. 15 Faced with a watersupply failure from the summits of the Sierra Nevada to the subsurface of the San
Joaquin Valley, California finally enacted comprehensive groundwater regulation
legislation. As its title denotes, the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act of
2014 (“SGMA”) requires the sustainable management of the state’s 515
groundwater basins, preferably through groundwater sustainability plans
(“GSPs”) designed and approved by local groundwater sustainability agencies
(“GSAs”). 16
SGMA is the most ambitious groundwater legislation in the United States in
more than a generation, exceeding the goals of the Arizona Groundwater
Management Act of 1980. The daunting problem of California groundwater
overuse, and California’s sudden and firm commitment to achieving meaningful
and ideally sustainable groundwater use, raise questions of the utmost importance
for California agriculture. How will irrigators respond to SGMA’s statutory
imperatives? Will they adopt and obey GSPs—management plans overlying their
correlative property rights to use groundwater—or will they trigger groundwater
adjudications to define their respective legal rights? In 2015, the California
legislature anticipated this very question. 17 If they focus on the former option,
how will irrigators meet SGMA’s sustainability goals—by requiring increased
irrigation efficiency, the permanent retirement of irrigated ground, rotational
fallowing, categorical reductions in pumping, changes in cropping, or some
mixture of all the above? How will GSPs confront longstanding tensions among
groundwater irrigators, municipalities, underserved water communities, and
conservationists concerned about groundwater-dependent ecosystems? Policy
options, including water markets, abound. If irrigators pursue the adjudicatory
route, how will California courts reconcile SGMA with California’s correlative
rights groundwater regime, and how will courts confront their own inconsistent
precedents from past adjudications? Are GSPs that go too far in reducing
groundwater pumping vulnerable to takings challenges? Are groundwater
adjudications that confirm SGMA-induced pumping reductions vulnerable as
judicial takings? Ultimately, what does “sustainability” even mean for California
groundwater—and California agriculture? These are rich policy and legal

14. William M. Alley et al., Sustainability of Ground-Water Resources, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY
CIRCULAR 1186, at 20 (1993).
15. Bettina Boxall, Overpumping of Central Valley Groundwater Creating a Crisis, Experts Say, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 18, 2015.
16. CAL. WATER CODE § 10720.1 (West 2020).
17. Id. §§ 10720.1(i), 10720.5(c), 10737.2.
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questions. Irrigators, groundwater managers, water lawyers, think tanks, and
California’s State Water Resources Control Board (“SWRCB”) are wrestling
with them as they work through the SGMA process.
Most of these and other questions are presently unanswerable; it is simply
too early in the SGMA process to know. Like other states, California has,
through SGMA, enacted groundwater management legislation that knowingly
avoids or fundamentally conflicts with longstanding property doctrines in
groundwater. This is demonstrable proof that both the water law doctrines
themselves and the owners who putatively enjoy their protections have failed to
protect the groundwater systems upon which their rights depend—that is, to
achieve a functionally sustainable groundwater supply. In this regard, California
is anything but exceptional. Yet the end of California’s water exceptionalness has
a bright side. California’s legislative recognition of its own failures in
groundwater management, and SGMA’s commitment to address those failures,
provide an opportunity to glean lessons from other states that have recognized
and reacted to similar structural and doctrinal failures. Specifically, there is an
opportunity to review how irrigators themselves have devised binding
groundwater management plans that achieve substantial but tolerable reductions
in groundwater use. In many of California’s over-drafted groundwater basins, the
hardest question will be how to allocate groundwater supplies among large
numbers of overlying irrigators. 18
For the myriad of questions that SGMA raises, this question may have useful
and timely answers found elsewhere—specifically, in the recent Kansas
groundwater experience. This Article brings that experience to bear upon SGMA
and finds a fair amount of promise there. Part I provides a brief schematic survey
of the large and complex subject of California groundwater law, by describing its
founding doctrinal and jurisdictional principles, its evolution through
groundwater adjudications, and the contours of the modern California
groundwater right itself. With this survey as background, Part I concludes with a
description of the structure and substance of SGMA, emphasizing the challenges
it faces in negotiating between state and local control, between hydrological and
legal realities, and between collective groundwater management and individual
rights adjudication. Part II provides a similar survey of Kansas groundwater law,
starting with its statutory beginnings in 1945 through the groundwater revolution
of the late 1950s through the 1970s, a period which quietly but effectively
transformed groundwater doctrine and created jurisdictional divides between
state and local control. These developments produced the modern Kansas
groundwater right, an often-awkward hybrid combining the doctrinal features of
prior appropriation with effective operational features suggestive of the
reasonable use and correlative rights doctrines. By the turn of the twenty-first
18. Eric Garner et al., The Sustainable Groundwater Management Act and the Common Law of
Groundwater Rights—Finding a Consistent Path Forward for Groundwater Allocation, 38 U.C.L.A. J. ENVTL.
L. & POL’Y 163, 201 (2020).
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century, Kansas faced similar polarities that California now faces with SGMA:
polarities between state and local jurisdiction, between hydrological and legal
realities, and between the policy imperatives of collective management and the
stubborn facts of individual rights.
Why look to Kansas of all places? Despite the hydrological, jurisdictional,
and doctrinal differences between California and Kansas groundwater, there is
nonetheless a compelling structural similarity across both states. Both states have
recently enacted important legislation to address the problem of groundwater
depletion: Kansas created a new type of groundwater management area—the
Local Enhanced Management Area (“LEMA”) in 2012—while California
enacted SGMA in 2014. Out of both political and practical necessity, each state
has assigned the problem to local agencies, which in western Kansas and the
Central Valley are dominated by irrigators and agribusiness interests.
With these similarities in mind, Part III of this Article reviews the most
prominent features of collective groundwater management plans in Kansas—
especially those common to the three LEMAs that have been established across
the High Plains-Ogallala Aquifer since 2013. These are not small areas:
collectively, they comprise over 5,500 square miles, roughly the size of
Connecticut. Irrigators have put these plans together relatively quickly. Yet the
choices they have so far made to achieve meaningful groundwater conservation
have been revealingly consistent, both in their shared sense of what constitutes
substantial but tolerable reductions in groundwater use, but also in their
essentially equitable apportionment of how to achieve those reductions—choices
that reveal a deliberate ambivalence about the governing doctrines of Kansas
water law. These findings provide grounds for optimism about SGMA’s future.
Part IV distills the Kansas groundwater management experience into a series of
conclusions that may be of use to those working through the demands of the
SGMA process in California. Because they originate in such different legal
contexts, the Kansas and California groundwater experiences may even provide
principled instructions for achieving meaningful groundwater conservation
across the West—a useful template for every state in between them.
II. CALIFORNIA GROUNDWATER LAW: A SCHEMATIC REVIEW
A. The Founding Principles
California groundwater law essentially rests upon a tripod of common-law
doctrine, statutory jurisdiction, and the constitutional rule of reasonable use.
Because every leg of the tripod consists of roughly joined segments, the legal
tripod has wobbled for over a century.
The common-law doctrinal leg is that of correlative rights, established in
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Katz v. Walkinshaw over a century ago and complicated regularly ever since. 19
Katz rejected the rule of capture for groundwater and replaced it with the
correlative rights doctrine, which allocates a usufructuary right to a “fair and just
portion” of the groundwater supply to each overlying landowner. 20 These rights
are similar to riparian rights, because they can be asserted at any time, and
subsequent correlative rights are entitled to equal dignity with existing rights.21
Where the groundwater basin is in a condition of overdraft—that is, where the
groundwater supply exceeds the safe annual yield of the groundwater basin—
then use is restricted to overlying landowners based on their reasonable needs.22
Yet where groundwater is available in excess of overdraft, and overlying owners
do not need such surplus water, then the correlative rights doctrine allows for
appropriative rights; put another way, out-of-basin pumpers who are pumping
within a basin’s safe yield are treated as appropriators. 23 Because some of the
most important groundwater disputes in California history have concerned
conflicts between out-of-basin users (usually cities and municipal water
providers) and in-basin users (often irrigators), determinations of whether a basin
is in overdraft, and what constitutes safe yield, have been fundamental to
deciding whether valid appropriative rights exist under the correlative rights
doctrine. 24 As briefly discussed below in Section I.B., these conflicts eventually
provided California courts with an opportunity to recognize significant
modifications of the correlative rights doctrine: those of prescription and, later, of
mutual prescription. Under these modifications, each non-overlying pumper in a
groundwater basin can acquire prescriptive rights against both overlying owners
and prior appropriators by pumping in excess of safe yield for the prescriptive
period. 25
California’s common-law correlative rights doctrine thus actually
incorporates three doctrinal segments. It limits in-basin, on-parcel water use to a
fair and proportionate share. It allows for out-of-basin, off-parcel appropriative
rights, provided groundwater supplies are available in excess of safe yield. And
under certain adjudicated situations, it recognizes prescriptive rights for out-ofbasin pumpers.
The second wobbly leg of California groundwater law is jurisdiction. Under
§ 1200 of the California Water Code, originally enacted in 1913, the SWRCB has
19. Katz v. Walkinshaw, 141 Cal. 116 (1903).
20. Id. at 136.
21. Burr v. Maclay Rancho Water Co., 154 Cal. 428, (1908); see Marion Kirkwood, Appropriation of
Percolating Water, 1 STAN. L. REV. 1, 4–7 (1948).
22. Tehachapi-Cummings Cty. Water Dist. v. Armstrong, 49 Cal. App. 3d 992, 925–27 (1975). What
constitutes “overlying land” or “overlying use” has not been clearly defined, but in-basin pumpers qualify as
overlying landowners. ANTHONY DAN TARLOCK & JASON ANTHONY ROBISON, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND
RESOURCES § 4.14, at 194 (2020 ed.).
23. TARLOCK & ROBISON, supra note 22, at 194.
24. City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 224 (1975).
25. City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d 908, 908 (1949); TARLOCK & ROBISON, supra note
22, § 4.17, at 199.
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permitting and regulatory authority over surface waters of the state, which
includes “subterranean streams flowing through known and definite channels.” 26
The third category of California water—percolating groundwater—is beyond the
state’s jurisdiction and is not subject to statutory adjudications. 27 This leg extends
back to 1899, when the California Supreme Court decided Los Angeles v.
Pomeroy, a quintessential case of legal instrumentalism. 28 Pomeroy was an
eminent domain case concerning the value of a narrow strip of land adjacent to
the Los Angeles River. If the alluvial groundwater beneath the condemned land
could be classified as a “subterranean stream,” then it was legally part of the
river; therefore, Los Angeles did not have to pay compensation for the strip’s
water supplies because the city held recognized pueblo rights to the river. But if
the water was instead “percolating water,” it was part of the condemned estate in
land, and the city would have to pay compensation for the water’s value—
because prior to Katz, the rule of capture (or absolute ownership) was widely
perceived as the prevailing rule for percolating groundwater in California. 29 The
judicial assumption or premise that the rule of capture governed groundwater
created the need, under the circumstances of Pomeroy, for California’s
“subterranean stream doctrine.” 30 As Professor Sax has written:
[E]ither Los Angeles had to lose a case that the court undoubtedly
believed the city deserved to win, or the court had to look to a legal
theory that solved the immediate problem before it, but created a
hydrologically untenable distinction among groundwater at different
stages of its voyage through the San Fernando Valley. The Pomeroy
court chose to decide in favor of a result that protected Los Angeles’
treasury at the expense of a coherent legal theory. 31
Section 1200 effectively codified Los Angeles v. Pomeroy. Ever since,
California courts and the SWRCB have struggled with applying the antiquated
legal categories of “subterranean streams” and “known and definite channels” to
long-known hydrological realities. 32 Such categories “are inapt, and efforts to fit
water into the law’s categories by using these technical-sounding classifications

26. CAL. WATER § 1200 (West 2020).
27. Id. § 2500.
28. City of Los Angeles v. Pomeroy, 124 Cal. 597 (1899).
29. Sax, supra note 11, at 276–80.
30. Id. at 280, 283.
31. Id. at 280.
32. For example, in N. Gualala Water Co. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 139 Cal. App. 4th 1577,
1585–86 (2006), the SWRCB successfully defended its interpretation of Section 1200 and Pomeroy according
to a four-part test for determining jurisdiction that it had developed internally following a 1999 decision, In re
Garrapata Water Co., State Wat. Res. Control Bd. Dec. No. 1639 (June 17, 1999).
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give the enterprise a somewhat daffy air.” 33 Like their judicial counterparts in
other western states that segregate their legal regimes for surface and
groundwater, California judges faced with deciding these classifications lament
the segregation. 34 Because “percolating groundwater” is thus outside of the
state’s jurisdiction, the regulation of groundwater pumping in California was,
until SGMA, entirely a matter of local regulation. Indeed, the most
knowledgeable water law expert on the California bench wrote nearly fifty years
ago that it is indeed “curious that although regulation of surface waters is
properly a responsibility of the State, groundwater regulation is somehow viewed
as a ‘local’ concern . . . .”35
The third (and most stable) leg of the California groundwater tripod is the
constitutional rule of reasonable use—the most important component of modern
California water law. 36 This leg owes its existence to a San Joaquin Valley case,
Herminghaus v. Southern California Edison Co.37 In Herminghaus, the
California Supreme Court held that the riparian doctrine, established alongside
that of prior appropriation for surface use, 38 entitled riparian landowners to
nothing less than the entire flow of the San Joaquin River on the grounds that it
“constitutes a reasonable use thereof within the intent and meaning” of the
English common law which California had adopted at statehood—thereby
blocking any appropriation of the river’s water supply by an upstream utility.39
Riparian landowners thus held vested rights to the river’s full flows, even if they
used the water wastefully. 40 The court’s pure and severe application of the
riparian rights doctrine, and the waste and impracticality it explicitly condoned,
provoked public outrage and an immediate public reaction. By popular initiative,
California amended its constitution in 1928 to prohibit unreasonable use: “the
right to water or to the use or flow of water in or from any natural stream . . .
shall be limited to such water as shall be reasonably required . . . and such right

33. Sax, supra note 11, at 273.
34. See, e.g., N. Gualala Water Co., 139 Cal. App. 4th at 1590–91, (“As the present case illustrates,
classification disputes in this field quickly take on an Alice-in-Wonderland quality because the legal categories
. . . are drawn from antiquated case law and bear little or no relationship to hydrological realities.”); Collier v.
Arizona Dept. of Water Res., 722 P.2d 363, 366 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (“Arizona water law has developed into a
bifurcated [legal] system in which percolating groundwater is regulated under a set of laws completely distinct
from the laws regulating surface water. While this bifurcation provides a workable legal system, it often ignores
the scientific reality that groundwater and surface water are often connected.”); Spear T Ranch, Inc., v. Knaub,
269 Neb. 177, 183 (Neb. 2005) (“But Nebraska water law ignores the hydrological fact that ground water and
surface water are inextricably linked. Instead of an integrated system, we have two separate systems, one
allocating streamflows and the other allocating ground water.”).
35. Sax, supra note 11, at 301 (quoting now-Justice Ronald Robie, when he was a lawyer for the
SWRCB in 1973).
36. HUNDLEY, supra note 9, at 245 (quoting GOVERNOR’S COMMISSION TO REVIEW CALIFORNIA WATER
RIGHTS LAW, FINAL REPORT 9 (1978)).
37. 200 Cal. 81 (1926).
38. Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 349 (1886).
39. Herminghaus v. Southern California Electric Co., 200 Cal. 81, 104–05, 111–12 (1926).
40. HUNDLEY, supra note 9, at 245.
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does not and shall not extend to the waste or unreasonable use . . . of water.”41
The reasonable use requirement, once a “sleeping giant” of California water law,
has awakened and stalked the law as a “Bigfoot” at least since the 1970s.42
The amendment essentially reversed Herminghaus and adjusted the
relationship between California’s two categories of surface water rights—riparian
rights and appropriative rights. 43 But the constitutional language is more
expansive, encompassing “the right to water,” of which the right “to the use or
flow of water in or from any natural stream” is a part. 44 That expansiveness
makes sense given the earlier decision in Katz to adopt the principle of
reasonable use that animates the correlative rights doctrine. As the court in Katz
noted, only if there is groundwater in excess of the reasonable needs of the
overlying owners may water be exported for use on non-overlying lands.45
Modern case law has confirmed the importance of the reasonable use limitation
for California groundwater. 46 Reasonable use is “an inherent limitation on all
water rights” in California, whether they are subject to the SWRCB’s jurisdiction
or not. 47 As the California Supreme Court noted, “the courts have concurrent
jurisdiction with the legislatively established administrative agencies to enforce
the self-executing provisions of Article X, section 2. Private parties thus may
seek court aid in the first instance to prevent unreasonable water use . . . .”48
Within the context of integrating the management of surface water and
groundwater supplies, courts have constitutional authority “to unify the law of
surface and groundwater rights situationally where unintegrated management and
regulation would result in unreasonable use. And the courts have this
constitutional power despite the general legal distinction [in California] between
the surface water and groundwater systems.” 49

41. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2 (originally codified as CAL. CONST. art. XIV, § 3).
42. HARRISON DUNNING, WATER ALLOCATION IN CALIFORNIA: LEGAL RIGHTS AND REFORM NEEDS 29
(1982); Brian E. Gray, In Search of Bigfoot: The Common Law Origins of Article X, Section 2 of the California
Constitution, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 225, 226, 272 (1989).
43. Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 2 Cal. 2d 351, 363–64, 384 (1935).
44. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2.
45. Katz v. Walkinshaw, 141 Cal. 116, 135–36 (1903). As Professor Gray has noted, the decision in Katz
to modify the common law of groundwater by incorporating the doctrine of reasonable use was an effort to
ensure that “the law comports with the environment and economy of California . . . .” Gray, supra note 42, 257
n.163.
46. Light v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 226 Cal App. 4th 1463, 1479 (2014), as modified of denial of
reh’g (July 11, 2014) (quoting People ex. Rel. State Water Resources Control Bd. V. Forni, 54 Cal App. 3d 743,
750 (1976)) (“The rule of reasonableness is now ‘the overriding principle governing the use of water in
California.’”); see, e.g., Allegretti & Co. v. County of Imperial, 138 Cal. App. 4th 1261, 1279 (2006)
(“Allegretti’s [groundwater right] is nonetheless restricted to a reasonable beneficial use consistent with article
X, section 2 of the California Constitution.”).
47. Brian E. Gray, The Property Right in Water, 9 HASTINGS W-NW J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 10 (2002).
48. Envtl. Defense Fund, Inc. v. East Bay Mun. Utility Dist., 26 Cal. 3d 183, 200 (1980).
49. Brian E. Gray, The Reasonable Use Doctrine in California Water Law and Policy, in ALLISON
LASSITER ED., SUSTAINABLE WATER: CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS FROM CALIFORNIA 83, 97 (2015).
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Placed on the ground of the Central Valley, the legal tripod of California
groundwater can be shortened, simplified, and stabilized—at least for the
comparative purposes of this Article. The valley is dominated by irrigators using
groundwater on their own lands or within their respective groundwater basins,
where pumping substantially exceeds safe yield conditions. Thus, the commonlaw doctrinal leg can be simplified by ignoring the complexities of appropriative
rights and mutual prescription—complexities that have driven the most
prominent adjudications of California groundwater. 50 The jurisdictional leg can
be similarly simplified by collapsing surface water and “subterranean streams,”
leaving only the “percolating” groundwater of the Central Valley Aquifer—
supplies that are safely beyond the SWRCB’s jurisdictional reach pursuant to
§ 1200 of the California Water Code. Admittedly, this simplification ignores
some of the Valley’s most important water supplies. These include the Kings,
Kern, and San Joaquin Rivers and their alluvial aquifers, which supply
groundwater-dependent ecosystems such as the Kern and Pixley National
Wildlife Refuges, precious remnants of what used to be Tulare Lake. Such
supplies are regulated under distinct state and federal legal regimes. 51 Because
this Article is limited to how groundwater irrigators can reach consensus over
their mutual use of the Central Valley Aquifer, it treats this groundwater supply
largely as geologists do—as a single, functionally unconfined, and heterogeneous
aquifer, in which the vertical movement of groundwater depends primarily on the
properties of the aquifer’s fine-grained sediments and the local influences of
irrigators’ high-capacity wells. 52 The third constitutional leg does not need
simplification: California’s constitutional command of reasonable use extends to
all of the groundwater supplies of the Valley. 53 For the purposes of this Article,
these simplifications seem reasonable enough.
B. The Principles, Adjudicated
The long and tortured history of California groundwater adjudications
generally shows that such a legal simplification is tolerable, because the courts
have not made a fetish of received doctrine. These adjudications can be divided
into four phases. 54 The first phase began in 1949 when the California Supreme
50. See generally WILLIAM BLOMQUIST, DIVIDING THE WATERS (1992); see infra Section I.B.
51. The water supplies of national wildlife refuges enjoy substantial protections under federal wildlife
law. See, e.g., National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act, 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(1) (2020) (effective
Oct. 30, 1998).
52. THOMAS E. REILLY ET AL., GROUND-WATER AVAILABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES: U.S.
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY CIRCULAR 1323, at 44 (2008).
53. Garner et al., supra note 18, at 185.
54. This and the following several paragraphs rely substantially on a recent analysis of California
groundwater adjudications, see generally, Leon Szeptycki et al., A Flexible Framework or Rigid Doctrine?
Assessing the Legacy of the 2000 Mojave Decision for Resolving Disputes over Groundwater in California, 37
STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 185, 211–38 (2018). The author would like to extend his thanks to two of the article’s
authors, Professor Szeptycki and Professor William Blomquist, for their helpful discussions of these
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Court decided City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, a case concerning the longoverdrafted Western Unit of the Raymond Basin. 55 The adjudication pitted two
archetypical groundwater interests against each other—cities that were not
overlying landowners and longstanding irrigators who were. Under the
correlative rights doctrine of Katz, the cities—as appropriators—risked losing
their share of the safe yield of the basin. Conversely, under the doctrine of
prescriptive rights, overlying irrigators and other pumpers risked losing their
water rights to the cities. Faced with the real risk posed by these doctrinal
polarities, the parties reached a settlement and stipulated judgment that relied
upon a simple principle: all parties would reduce their pumping by a proportional
amount necessary to restore the basin to safe yield. 56 That principle ripened into
the doctrinal innovation of mutual prescription, which ultimately justified the
settlement: all of the pumpers had established equal rights of mutual prescription
against each other because the basin was overdrafted. Thus, all of the water users
were required to proportionately reduce their pumping to correct that overdraft,
regardless of their status as appropriator or overlying landowner. 57 The result of
the mutual prescription doctrine—proportionate reductions regardless of
pumping class—was probably more important than the doctrine itself. That is
because the result gave the court grounds to approve the settlement based on
more general rules of equity and the public interest. 58 City of Pasadena’s
“doctrinal choreography” of mutual prescription, and its practical equity of
proportionate reductions, provided a template for many groundwater
adjudications for the next several decades. 59
The dancing changed in 1975 when the California Supreme Court issued its
decision in City of Los Angeles v. San Fernando, a decades-long, highly complex
case involving mostly municipal groundwater interests. 60 The trial court followed
the methodology of City of Pasadena—mutual prescription and proportionate
reductions—but the Supreme Court reversed, changing California groundwater
adjudication law in two important ways. First, it announced a newfound
hesitancy about prescriptive rights (and proportionate reductions) because
municipalities and other public entities—often the largest water users involved in
such adjudications—were immune from prescription. That returned the factually
complicated matter of determining individual groundwater rights to the center of
the adjudicatory process. Second, the California Supreme Court introduced the
methodology of equitable apportionment as an alternative approach to
adjudications and other issues involving California groundwater.
55. City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d 908, 921–22 (1949); BLOMQUIST, supra note 48, at
79–80.
56. Szeptycki et al., supra note 52, at 194.
57. City of Pasadena, 33 Cal. 2d at 935.
58. Id. at 933.
59. Szeptycki et al., supra note 52, at 194.
60. City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199 (1975).
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adjudicating groundwater use—a methodology used by the Supreme Court of the
United States in interstate water litigation. 61 Although in dicta, the recourse to
equitable apportionment made sense as a practical critique of mutual
prescription. However, it was an odd choice doctrinally. As of the date of the San
Fernando decision, the interstate cases which had actually accomplished
interstate allocations were primarily those involving western states which
followed the prior appropriation doctrine. 62 Thus, for priority of appropriation to
be a “guiding principle” in California groundwater adjudications clashed with the
state’s longstanding adherence to the correlative rights doctrine. 63 San
Fernando’s departure from Pasadena killed that adjudication, created serious
problems for subsequent adjudications, and produced a disconcerting level of
uncertainty about the actual attributes of a California groundwater right. 64
That uncertainty continued as a consequence of the third major groundwater
adjudication in California, City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency (“Mojave”),
decided in 2000.65 In fighting the last war, as lawyers are wont to do, most of the
parties to this extraordinarily complex adjudication followed the apparent
precepts and practical commands of San Fernando. They pursued a settlement
path guided by equitable apportionment, as well as a deliberate avoidance of
strictly determining or enforcing individual rights, on the grounds that such
strictness would likely violate the California Constitution’s commands of
reasonable use and the avoidance of waste. 66 The California Supreme Court once
again changed directions and rejected that approach. It rejected the use of
equitable apportionment that it had apparently blessed in San Fernando for
determining groundwater allocations between overlying owners, appropriators,
and those claiming prescriptive rights. It rejected the avoidance of classifying and
prioritizing individual rights as rationalized by Article X, Section 2 of the state
constitution. 67
After Mojave, neither the practical instrumentalism of mutual prescriptive
rights as established in Pasadena in 1949 nor the collective approach of equitable

61. Id. at 265 & n.61 (citing Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945).
62. See, e.g., Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 464 (1922) (equitable apportionment based primarily
on the respective states’ adherence to the prior appropriation doctrine); Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589,
618 (1945) (equitable apportionment based on prior appropriation but including other important factors as well).
Since 1945, the Supreme Court of the United States has not equitably apportioned interstate water supplies. The
Court maintained its general allegiance to prior appropriation as a guiding principle for equitable apportionment
in Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176 (1982), and again in the same case, Colorado v. New Mexico, 467
U.S. 310 (1984).
63. City of Los Angeles, 14 Cal. 3d at 266 & n.61 (quoting Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 618
(1945).
64. Szeptycki et al., supra note 52, at 197–200.
65. City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 23 Cal. 4th 1224 (2000).
66. Szeptycki et al., supra note 52, at 205–06.
67. Mojave Water Agency, 23 Cal. 4th at 1243–50. For a detailed history of the case, see J. M. Miller,
When Equity Is Unfair—Upholding Long-Standing Principles of California Water Law in City of Barstow v.
Mojave Water Agency, 32 MCGEORGE L. REV. 991 (2001).
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allocation blessed in San Fernando in 1975 were legally viable methods of
adjudicating groundwater rights. Mojave can be read pessimistically as
reaffirming a formalistic and individualistic approach to adjudicating
groundwater rights—a discouraging development given the cost and complexity
of adjudications. 68 Yet Mojave can also be read optimistically, seeing in the
decision the potential to accommodate the recognition of individual rights and
priorities without foreclosing the ability of the parties and the trial courts to reach
creative and effective resolutions of groundwater adjudications. 69 A recent
empirical study analyzed the seven groundwater adjudications that have been
completed since Mojave, to evaluate the case’s actual effects on those
adjudications and to limn any lessons they may hold for the design and
implementation of GSPs under SGMA. 70 Its authors reached a number of
encouraging conclusions. In five of the seven adjudications, the parties and the
courts reached relatively quick settlements using creative groundwater
management solutions—and, importantly, by finessing the property rights rules
for California groundwater. 71 They did so largely by “effectively adopting a clear
rule of supremacy of overlying rights, while also setting up a system for
reallocating those rights to urban users into the future.” 72
C. SGMA
California long resisted the regulation of groundwater under a permit system,
largely because of opposition from irrigation interests in the San Joaquin
Valley. 73 But the long drought that began at least in 2006 forced the state to
recognize the crisis caused by unregulated pumping. In typical California
fashion, it enacted SGMA—a comprehensive regulatory plan for California
groundwater. It took effect on January 1, 2015, and amendments clarifying its
legislative intent took effect in 2016.74 SGMA fills twelve chapters of the
California Water Code, along with multiple cross-references to existing
procedures for groundwater adjudications. Reduced to its essentials, SGMA
pursues two goals: (1) the sustainable management of the state’s groundwater
68. See, e.g., Eric Garner, Right Back Where We Started from: The Last 25 Years of Groundwater Law in
California, 36 MCGEORGE L. REV. 413 (2005).
69. See, e.g., R. McGlothlin & J. Acos, The Golden Rule* of Water Management, 9 GOLDEN GATE
ENVTL. L. J. 109 (2016).
70. Szeptycki et al., supra note 52, at 188.
71. Id. at 185–86.
72. Id. at 211.
73. Barbara Andrews & Sally Fairfax, Groundwater and Intergovernmental Relations in the Southern
San Joaquin Valley of California: What Are All These Cooks Doing to the Broth?, 55 U. COLO. L. REV. 145,
152–53 (1984).
74. For a procedural history of the enactment of the SGMA, see Tina Cannon Leahy, Desperate Times
Call for Sensible Measures: The Making of the California Sustainable Groundwater Management Act, 9
GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 5 (2016).
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basins; and (2) the achievement of that goal primarily through the work of local
agencies, rather than the SWRCB or the state Department of Water Resources
(“DWR”). 75
SGMA defines what is sustainable for groundwater usage—whether as a
“sustainability goal,” “sustainable groundwater management,” or “sustainable
yield.” Within the historical context of California’s groundwater adjudications
between Pasadena and Mojave, these are terms suggestive of layers of commonlaw definitions. 76 But as a statute, SGMA defines sustainability as something that
avoids an “undesirable result,” which consists of the following:
(1) Chronic lowering of groundwater levels indicating a significant and
unreasonable depletion of supply if continued over the planning and
implementation horizon. Overdraft during a period of drought is not
sufficient to establish a chronic lowering of groundwater levels if
extractions and groundwater recharge are managed as necessary to
ensure that reductions in groundwater levels or storage during a period of
drought are offset by increases in groundwater levels or storage during
other periods.
(2) Significant and unreasonable reduction of groundwater storage.
(3) Significant and unreasonable seawater intrusion.
(4) Significant and unreasonable degraded water quality, including the
migration of contaminant plumes that impair water supplies.
(5) Significant and unreasonable land subsidence that substantially
interferes with surface land uses.
(6) Depletions of interconnected surface water that have significant and
unreasonable adverse impacts on beneficial uses of the surface water. 77
Notably, these “undesirable results” are themselves qualified by what
decision-makers determine to be both “significant” and “unreasonable.” They are
not to be confused with how a hydrogeologist would determine sustainability. 78
SGMA next sets forth the procedures by which to achieve this definition of
sustainable groundwater management. While local agencies take the lead, the
state plays an important supervisory role. SGMA either recognizes existing local
agencies or allows a local agency or combination of agencies to decide to
become the GSA for their overlying groundwater basin. 79 Once the GSA has
been formed, and the state has recognized it, the GSA’s primary duty is to
develop a binding GSP. SGMA requires that GSAs for high- and medium75. CAL. WATER § 10720.1 (West 2020).
76. Garner et al., supra note 18, at 173–77.
77. CAL. WATER § 10721(x).
78. For a critique of the SGMA’s approach to sustainable yield, see John J. Perona, A Dry Century in
California: Climate Change, Groundwater, and a Science-Based Approach for Preserving the Unseen
Commons, 45 ENVTL. L. REV. 641 (2015).
79. CAL. WATER § 10723.
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priority basins complete their GSPs by 2020 or 2022, depending upon the basin;
the DWR had earlier established the priority of these basins. 80 Many GSPs have
already been submitted, and several propose retiring groundwater-irrigated
acreage as a means to reach SGMA’s sustainability goals. Indeed, permanent
land fallowing may be an unpleasant feature of GSPs in primarily agricultural
areas such as the San Joaquin Valley. 81
Once the GSP is adopted, it must achieve its sustainability goals within
twenty years, but extensions of five to ten years and even longer are available if
the GSA can show good cause for the extension. 82 Importantly, the GSP must
consider the interests of all beneficial users of groundwater and not just those
who hold water rights; the latter include environmental users of groundwater,
Native American tribes, and disadvantaged communities. 83 DWR reviews the
local GSP to ensure compliance with SGMA’s sustainability goals, and it must
review the plan at least every five years. 84
SGMA similarly divides the power to regulate pumping to achieve the
sustainability goals of the GSP. The GSAs are endowed with clear authority to
require wells to be registered and equipped with meters. 85 They can also impose
well spacing on new wells, regulate pumping to minimize well interference, and
even suspend pumping to meet the requirements of the GSP. 86 GSAs also have
the power to impose civil penalties against pumpers who violate the specific rules
of the GSP, or bring a court action to do the same. 87 Again, the state serves as the
backstop: if the SWRCB determines that a GSP is deficient in meeting SGMA’s
sustainability goals, it can intervene and place the basin on probationary status,
identify the plan’s problems, and develop its own interim plan as necessary—
until the GSA reforms its GSP. 88 While SGMA seeks to secure a maximum
degree of local control, it is consistently clear that the state, through DWR and
the SWRCB, will oversee the management process to ensure that local GSAs are
in fact meeting the act’s sustainability goals. 89
The most telling aspect of SGMA is its treatment of water rights. There is a
clear tension within the Act between the security of groundwater rights
established according to California property law and the sustainability goals
imposed by SGMA.90 SGMA attempts to alleviate this tension by consistently

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
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Id. §§ 10720.7, 10933(b)(8).
TARLOCK & ROBISON, supra note 22, § 4.15, at 198.
CAL. WATER § 10727.2.
Id. § 10723.2.
Id. §§ 10733, 10733.4, 10733.8.
Id. §§ 10725.6, 10725.8.
Id. § 10726.4.
Id. §§ 10726.4, 10732.
CAL. WATER §§ 10735.2, 10735.4, 10735.8, 10736.
Id. § 10725.
Id. § 10720.1. For an excellent recent discussion of this tension, see Garner et al., supra note 18.
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deferring to the former: it takes pains to state that the act neither determines
property rights in the use of groundwater established at common law, nor
functions as a commentary on them. 91 The local agencies have no power to create
such property rights: GSAs do not have the power to issue well permits, and
GSPs do not function as a determination of groundwater rights. 92 SGMA
similarly defers to the groundwater adjudication process: adjudicated basins are
mostly exempt from SGMA’s requirements, but ongoing adjudications must be
managed to minimize interference with a GSP. 93 The 2015 amendments to
SGMA were generally focused on streamlining the adjudication process for
groundwater basins, so that adjudications could not raise procedural opportunities
to delay the implementation of GSPs in high- and medium-priority basins. 94
D. The Coming Collisions in the post-SGMA Legal Landscape
The enactment of SGMA in 2014 has forced the statutory imperative of
sustainability upon the legal regime of California groundwater. As a
consequence, massive collisions almost certainly await. Begin with the property
right in California groundwater: it is the logical starting place. 95 The individual,
overlying right was conceived over a century ago according to the correlative
rights doctrine in Katz. It fell under the governance of the constitutional mandate
of reasonable use. It has endured the instrumentalist and doctrinal oscillations
created by adjudications ever since Pasadena—oscillations largely forced by
relentless municipal growth. But in agriculturally dominated basins such as the
San Joaquin Valley, SGMA has forced the right to confront its own attributes, as
legal doctrine collides with groundwater depletion. What was reasonable in the
pre-SGMA world is not sustainable in a post-SGMA world.
The other collisions are similarly daunting and probably unavoidable. Local
GSA control of the GSP will likely collide with the state’s power to take over the
process if DWR and the SWRCB find the GSP to be deficient. The
administrative law and procedure of SGMA will collide with the legal process of
adjudications. Agricultural interests and overlying pumpers will predictably
collide with municipalities and other parties with appropriative and prescriptive
rights and claims. And in primarily agricultural basins, there will be collisions
between agricultural interests themselves: between resident and non-resident
growers, as well as between longer-established growers of traditional Central
Valley crops and arriviste nut growers. 96

91. See CAL. WATER §§ 10720.5, 10720.8.
92. Id. § 10726.4.
93. Id. § 10720.8.
94. Id. §§ 10720.1(i), 10720.5(c), 10737.2.
95. Garner et al., supra note 18.
96. ARAX, supra note 7, at 299–341 (describing the agricultural empire of the Wonderful Company and
its founder, Stewart Resnick, of Beverly Hills, a non-agricultural region of southern California).

511

2021 / High Plains Lessons for California’s Sustainable Groundwater
Management Act
III. KANSAS GROUNDWATER LAW: A SCHEMATIC REVIEW
Kansas used to resemble the Central Valley. Millions of years ago, its
western portion was a vast inland sea, even bigger than Tulare Lake. At the end
of the last ice age—about 12,000 years ago—it received the sands, gravels, and
melting glacial waters of the Rocky Mountains, which together deposited
themselves into what is now the High Plains-Ogallala Aquifer. When Kansas
became a territory in 1854, its western boundary extended to the eastern slope of
the Colorado Rockies, giving it territorial rights to mountain rivers, such as the
South Platte and the Arkansas. But once Kansans became aware of these
blessings, they did not last very long. The Colorado Gold Rush of 1859
convinced Kansas territory to cede its western holdings to Colorado in 1861. A
decade or so later, Kansas surface irrigators started diverting the Arkansas River
near the state line, taking every drop that flowed out of Colorado.97
Unlike California, Kansas largely depends upon foreign sources for its water.
It depends upon foreign places, the rivers that arise upstream in Colorado and
Nebraska but contribute relatively small, highly variable surface water supplies.
It also depends upon a foreign time, the geological past that produced the High
Plains-Ogallala Aquifer. These groundwater supplies are substantial and
dependable, but they are largely non-renewable.
Kansas water law also used to resemble California’s, but that too has
changed. Like California, Kansas adopted the English common law in the 1850s,
recognized the prior appropriation doctrine soon thereafter, and developed a
relatively uneventful legal regime combining the riparian and prior appropriation
doctrines. 98 Even the doctrines did not clash: Kansas has no epic cases such as
Lux v. Haggin because it allocated the humid, eastern portion of the state to the
former doctrine and the dry, High Plains portion to the latter. However, a series
of legal setbacks in the 1940s exposed the obvious deficiencies of Kansas’s legal
regime. Interstate litigation and federal water resources planning both put a
premium on the state’s ability to quantify its water supplies, something difficult
to achieve under the riparian doctrine. 99 And in 1944, the Kansas Supreme Court
held that the state’s water law was ineffectual regarding groundwater. 100

97. JAMES SHEROW, WATERING THE VALLEY: DEVELOPMENT ALONG THE HIGH PLAINS ARKANSAS
RIVER, 1870–1950, at 79–92 (1991).
98. Burke W. Griggs, Beyond Drought: Water Rights in the Age of Permanent Depletion, 62 U. KAN. L.
REV. 1263, 1273–79 (2014).
99. Id. at 1278.
100. State ex rel. Peterson Co. v. Bd. of Agric., 149 P.2d 604, 607–09 (Kan. 1944).
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A. The Founding Principles of Kansas Water Law
In response to these challenges, Kansas enacted the Kansas Water
Appropriation Act of 1945 (“KWAA”), comprehensively rewriting the state’s
water law. 101 The framers of the KWAA studied the water laws of all the western
states, and the California experience informed their work. 102 The KWAA
codified the doctrine of prior appropriation statewide for all of the state’s water
supplies, including groundwater. 103 The KWAA established a permit requirement
for all non-domestic rights and provided a statutory procedure by which pre-1945
rights were recognized and permitted as vested rights. 104 It placed jurisdiction
over all of the state’s waters and water supplies under the Chief Engineer of the
state’s division of water resources (“KDA-DWR”), a subordinate division of the
Kansas Department of Agriculture. 105 It expressly forbids the acquisition of water
rights by adverse possession or use, thus foreclosing the possibility of
prescriptive rights. 106
Compared to the wobbly tripod of California groundwater law, the KWAA
appears to enjoy a much more stable design. The doctrinal leg consists of just one
segment, that of prior appropriation; it repudiated the riparian doctrine and leaves
no room for any other. Same for the jurisdictional leg: all the waters of the state
fall under the chief engineer’s jurisdiction and not that of any local agency.
Finally, the KWAA mandates reasonable use and prohibits waste, rendering
unnecessary any constitutional provision to that effect.
B. The Principles, Compromised
Yet Kansas groundwater law soon developed destabilizing flaws. The
principal doctrinal flaw was latent in the application of the prior appropriation
doctrine to the vast but non-renewable supplies of the High Plains-Ogallala
Aquifer. The original version of the KWAA required the Chief Engineer of
KDA-DWR to put water to beneficial use by granting water rights, provided the
water was available and its use did not impair existing rights; this is a standard
duty under the prior appropriation doctrine. 107 But the Ogallala posed a problem
for the doctrine in its pure form. During the 1950s, the Ogallala’s largely

101. Kansas Water Appropriation Act of 1945, ch. 390, § 1 (codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82a-701 to
82a-745, 42-303, 42-313 (2020)); see generally John C. Peck, The Kansas Water Appropriation Act: A FiftyYear Retrospective, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 735, 736 (1995).
102. Griggs, supra note 96, at 1276–79.
103. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82a-702, 82a-706, 82a-721 (2020).
104. Id. §§ 82a-705, 82a-709, 82a-704a, 82a-704b.
105. Id. §§ 82a-702, 82a-706.
106. Id. § 82a-705.
107. Kansas Water Appropriation Act of 1945, ch. 390, § 1 (codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82a-701 to
82a-745, 42-303, 42-313 (2020)). The Kansas rule was essentially the same as those of other prior appropriation
jurisdictions with permit requirements, such as Wyoming. See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-503 (2020).
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undeveloped water supplies were available for beneficial use well in excess of
the needs of existing rights; but any development of the aquifer would
necessarily lower groundwater levels, impairing existing rights under the 1945
standard. To enable the development of the aquifer, Kansas softened the
impairment standard for granting new water rights in 1957 by defining it as
impairment “beyond a reasonable economic limit.” 108 Henceforth, KDA-DWR
could grant junior rights whose use lowered groundwater levels. Holders of
senior rights to the Ogallala retained their ability to protect their rights in times of
shortage: the statutory sections for the administration of rights were left intact. 109
This redefinition of impairment for granting new rights, together with KDADWR’s liberal policy of granting new Ogallala rights without regard to the
aquifer’s long-term water supply, soon produced a regional problem of severe
over-appropriation. 110 KDA-DWR pursued the practice of granting new Ogallala
rights according to the net irrigation requirement (“NIR”) of the appurtenant
land. 111 By the late 1970s, Kansas had, at least in some regards, effectively
replaced the prior appropriation doctrine with something practically similar to the
correlative rights doctrine. 112 Landowners obtained the legal right to pump the
NIR of their crops, a regulatory approximation of a “just and fair” proportion of
the underlying groundwater supply. 113 And corn, not wheat, became the default
crop. 114 Irrigators with senior rights did not bring impairment complaints, and
they had their reasons. There was still enough water, and many who held senior
rights also held junior ones. 115 This doctrinal revolution went largely unnoticed,
probably because it was incomplete: prior appropriators could still protect their
rights.
The jurisdictional realities of Kansas water law soon underwent a significant
evolution as well. The Kansas Groundwater Management District Act
(“KGMDA”) was enacted in 1972. 116 Soon after its enactment, five groundwater
management districts (“GMDs”) were established during the 1970s. Collectively,
the GMDs cover almost all of the ground overlying the High Plains-Ogallala in

108. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-711 (Kan. L. 1957, ch. 539, § 16) (1957). For more on the 1957
amendments to the KWAA, see Peck, supra note 99, and Griggs, supra note 96.
109. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82a-716, 82a-717a (2020); for an exemplary discussion, see Garetson Bros. v.
American Warrior, Inc., 51 Kan. App. 2d 370, 380–82 (2015).
110. Griggs supra note 96, at 1285; John C. Peck, Groundwater Management in Kansas: A Brief History
and Assessment, 15 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 441, 443 (2006).
111. Griggs, supra note 96, at 1285.
112. Id. at 1305; A. Dan Tarlock, Prior Appropriation: Rule, Principle, or Rhetoric? 76 N.D. L. REV.
881, 900–01 (2000).
113. KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 5-5-12 (2020) (net irrigation requirements by county).
114. KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 5-24-2(c)(2)(A)(ii).
115. Griggs, supra note 96, at 1298–1304.
116. Act of Mar. 17, 1972, ch. 386, § 1–16, 1972 Kan. Sess. Laws 1416–30 (codified at KAN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 82a-1020 to 82-1035) (amended 1978); see John C. Peck, Kansas Groundwater Management Districts,
29 U. KAN. L. REV. 51 (1980).
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Kansas. GMDs have the authority to tax, to purchase and sell real property
(including water rights), and to draft regulations for water use within their
respective districts. 117 If approved by the Chief Engineer, these regulations
become binding and enforceable by the Chief Engineer; the GMDs have no
independent administrative or legal authority. 118 However, because they
encompass most of the irrigation in Kansas, the GMDs have become the state’s
most powerful water-related interest group.
By the late 1970s, the depletion of the High Plains-Ogallala Aquifer had
become all too apparent in Kansas. Local irrigation interests took the initiative to
amend the KGMDA in 1978, providing for the establishment of Intensive
Groundwater Use Control Areas (“IGUCAs”). 119 Based generally on similar
legislation in Oregon, the IGUCA statutes enable the Chief Engineer (either on
his own initiative, on the recommendation of a GMD, or by the submission of a
petition of 5% of the water rights owners within a GMD) to conduct hearings to
consider whether a particular area is suffering from excessive declines in surface
flows or of groundwater levels, from a decline in water quality, or from a
situation where groundwater withdrawals exceed recharge. 120 If the Chief
Engineer makes such a finding, he then conducts a second hearing to consider
whether and how to impose appropriate “corrective control provisions” that will
remedy the situation—most importantly, whether to impose reductions in
pumping. 121 After this second hearing, the Chief Engineer orders the
establishment of an IGUCA for the area under consideration and imposes the
corrective control provisions. 122 These provisions do not require the
administration of junior rights by strict priority; the Chief Engineer enjoys
regulatory leeway in this regard. 123
Since 1978, the Chief Engineer has established eight IGUCAs in Kansas—
most of them to protect surface flows from impairment caused by excessive
groundwater pumping.124 The most contentious IGUCA to date was undertaken
to protect the surface rights of the Cheyenne Bottoms State Wildlife Area, an
important refuge for migratory birds that depends on the flows of Walnut Creek
in west-central Kansas. 125 In the Walnut Creek IGUCA (1992), the Chief
117. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-1028 (2020).
118. Id. § 82a-1028(o).
119. Leland E. Rolfs, Comparing and Contrasting the Roles of the Division of Water Resources and the
Groundwater Management Districts in Groundwater Management and Regulation, 15 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y
505, 509–10 (2006).
120. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82a-1036, 82a-1037.
121. Id. § 82a-1038(a)–(b).
122. Id. § 82a-1038(b).
123. Id. § 82a-1038(c).
124. See Intensive Groundwater Use Control Areas (IGUCAs), KANSAS DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,
DIVISION OF WATER RESOURCES, https://agriculture.ks.gov/divisions-programs/dwr/managing-kansas-waterresources/intensive-groundwater-use-control-areas (last visited Mar. 17, 2021) (on file with the University of the
Pacific Law Review).
125. See John C. Peck, Property Rights in Groundwater—Some Lessons from the Kansas Experience, 12
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Engineer established a safe yield for the Walnut Creek Basin and ordered
pumping reductions to achieve that yield. The reduction order did not follow the
strict priorities of the rights which were impairing the wildlife area’s senior
surface right; rather, it reduced groundwater use according to three tranches of
priority. 126 Vested, or pre-1945 rights, suffered no reductions. Rights with
priorities between 1945 and 1965 suffered reductions—between 22% and 33%.
Rights junior to 1965 suffered much higher reductions—between 64% and
71%.127 The Walnut Creek IGUCA restored some degree of safe yield to an overdrafted groundwater basin; Professor John C. Peck has compared the result to the
Pasadena adjudication in this regard. 128
But the Chief Engineer has imposed no IGUCAs over the High PlainsOgallala Aquifer. He has not taken the initiative to do so himself, nor has any
GMD or the members of any GMD. More broadly, the Chief Engineer has almost
entirely avoided administering water rights according to priority over the nonrenewable Ogallala. As a group, Kansas water rights owners have almost entirely
avoided requesting the usual tools in a water-short situation—priority
administration, impairment investigations, and water rights adjudications.129
Largely as a consequence, depletion rates across the High Plains-Ogallala
Aquifer have continued and even accelerated.
C. Reasons for Owners’ Lack of Initiative and State Regulatory Inaction
Given that Kansas water law has long-established property rules and
management tools that can reduce groundwater depletions, why have the KDADWR or Kansas water rights owners not deployed them? The first answer is
over-appropriation. 130 Because most of the High Plains-Ogallala Aquifer is
effectively not replenishable (with typical recharge in the 1% to 3%
neighborhood), that over-appropriation is only becoming worse, especially as
corn and soybean hybrids, together with improved irrigation technology, allow
full irrigation in areas previously considered non-irrigable. As a result, even if

KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 493, 499 (2003) (recounting the Walnut Creek IGUCA’s origin).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 505. Peck correctly notes that the comparison is a rough one, since the KWAA expressly
prohibits prescriptive rights (KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-705).
129. But see Garetson Bros. v. American Warrior, Inc., 51 Kan. App. 2d 370 (2015) (enjoining a junior
groundwater right that KDA-DWR had found to be impairing a senior right. 51 Kan. App.2d 370 (2015). The
injunction was subsequently made permanent. Garetson Bros. v. American Warrior, Inc., 56 Kan. App. 2d 623
(2019). Notably, plaintiffs brought their impairment case directly to the district court; they did not pursue the
administrative remedy set forth in the KWAA. Such an independent defense of property rights alarmed the
Kansas Legislature, which promptly amended the procedural statutes related to impairment, henceforth
requiring all impairment claims to be filed with the Chief Engineer as a prerequisite to seeking judicial relief.
Kan. Laws 2017, ch. 55, §§ 1–2 (codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82a-716, 82a-717a).
130. See supra text accompanying note 108.
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every Kansas water right owner is acting within their legal rights (and nearly all
water rights owners do comply with the limitations of their permits), then these
depletions will continue to get worse.
The second answer has to do with the essentially reactive function of the
office of the Chief Engineer when it comes to water rights administration. The
KWAA requires him to protect water rights, but typically only when owners
request them to be protected. 131 Because Kansas water rights owners are largely
complying with the law by staying within the annual authorized quantities of
their water rights, and because irrigators have decided (both individually and
collectively) to not request the Chief Engineer to step in and order reductions, he
is loath to take independent action. Ordering reductions in pumping might
constitute an uncompensated taking under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution (along with parallel and stronger provisions under the Kansas
Constitution). 132 The likelihood of such a finding is probably small, 133 but the
political specter of takings haunts the minds of Kansas regulators. And while the
Chief Engineer has the statutory duty to protect water rights when their owners
request it, he does not have the duty to save the aquifer. Strong political interests,
especially the large irrigators who dominate the membership and policy of the
GMDs, have made clear that they would retaliate politically in the event of such
a positive direction by the Chief Engineer. The office is structurally
compromised in this regard: no other state water engineer in the West answers to
a secretary of agriculture, who in turn accommodates the agriculture industry. 134
Finally, Kansas groundwater irrigators have not used these rules and tools
because they strike them as too powerful and unpredictable. 135 Under Kansas’s
prior appropriation regime, an impairment investigation can lead to the
administration of junior rights and the reduction of junior groundwater pumping.
But very few irrigators have filed impairment complaints because priority
administration in a groundwater context can have far-reaching effects. 136 In a
“neighborhood” of groundwater rights, protecting one right can mean
administering as many as a dozen nearby rights, where the Chief Engineer finds
that their cones of depression intrude upon the senior right. 137 This creates an allor-nothing situation that makes irrigators hesitant to file an impairment
complaint. Moreover, many holders of senior groundwater rights hold junior
131. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-706b (2020); KAN. ADMIN. REGS. §§ 5-4-1, 5-4-1a (2020).
132. Peck, supra note 123 at 504–06.
133. Dave Owen, Taking Groundwater, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 253, 254 (2013).
134. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 74-506b, 82a-1901 (2020). The secretary of agriculture, who holds her or his
appointment from the Governor, repeatedly overruled water rights administration decisions made by the chief
engineer to protect the senior surface rights held by the Quivira National Wildlife Refuge. The outlawry has
prompted litigation. Audubon of Kan., Inc., v. U.S. Dept. of the Interior, No. 2:21-CV-02025, 2021 WL 151768
(D. Kan. Jan. 15, 2021).
135. Griggs, supra note 96, at 1291.
136. Id. at 1299–1300, 1300 (“sixteen impairment complaints out of nearly 40,000 groundwater rights?
That is not a tragedy; it seems more like a farce.”).
137. See supra note 127.
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rights as well, and so protecting the former might require shutting off the
latter. 138 As we will see below in Part III of this Article, groundwater irrigators in
Kansas tend to disfavor the severe logic of prior appropriation, and usually prefer
that a reduction in groundwater pumping be leveled against all rights equally
rather than according to priority.
The same concern largely explains why irrigators have not requested an
IGUCA over the Ogallala. They fear that the public hearing process, which
allows anyone to provide testimony, might place facts and expert opinion into the
record that argue for corrective control provisions far in excess of what they
might deem to be acceptable reductions in water use. An order that emerges from
the IGUCA process may very well be too severe for the very irrigators who
requested pumping reductions in the first place. 139
D. Predictable Self-Regulation: Local Enhanced Management Areas
How, then, to remedy a situation where irrigators are leery of deploying the
legal tools to protect their water rights and extend the practical life of the High
Plains-Ogallala Aquifer? Irrigators and KDA-DWR recognized two needs. There
is a need for local water users to generate their own plans for reducing
groundwater depletions. The landscape of groundwater management across the
Great Plains is littered with centrally imposed water conservation plans that
irrigators have rejected for being excessive in their reductions and politically
unpalatable for their lack of sensitivity to the concept of “local control.” 140 There
is also the need for the water reduction plans to be hydrologically meaningful and
legally enforceable.
During 2010 and 2011, there emerged a critical mass of groundwater
irrigators, mostly in Northwest Kansas Groundwater Management District No. 4,
who were willing to commit to a significant reduction in their water usage. But
these irrigators were unwilling to trust the IGUCA process due to its potential
unpredictability. In response, legislation enacted in 2012 provides for the
establishment of Local Enhanced Management Areas, or LEMAs. 141
The LEMA statute follows the main steps of the IGUCA statutes but with
some important procedural protections for irrigators who are interested in longterm groundwater conservation. Under the statute, the GMD can submit a local

138. Indeed, this was one of the reasons why the Walnut Creek IGUCA (see supra text accompanying
notes 123–26) did not provoke a sustained judicial challenge: holders of pre-1965 rights, which suffered
comparatively smaller reductions, also held many post-1965 rights, which suffered comparatively greater
reductions. A judicial resolution imposing strict priority administration according to the KWAA might have
well imposed greater reductions in overall pumping.
139. Griggs, supra note 96, at 1291.
140. Id. at 1311; Peck, supra note 123, at 505–06.
141. 2012 Kan. Sess. Laws 382 (codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-1041 (2020)).
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enhanced management plan to the Chief Engineer for review. 142 Such a plan may
include proposed reductions in water use, methods to improve the temporal
flexibility of water use, and means by which to transfer water between water
rights holders. At this review stage, the Chief Engineer evaluates the plan to
determine whether it is acceptable for consideration; after review, he
communicates with the GMD to recommend changes, express his reservations,
and provide other feedback. Where KDA-DWR has determined that a LEMA
proposal is deficient, the Chief Engineer has returned the plan to the GMD for
revisions. 143
After this review period, if the Chief Engineer decides that the local
enhanced management plan is sound, he initiates proceedings for the
establishment of a LEMA. 144 These proceedings consist of at least two hearings.
At the first hearing, the Chief Engineer appoints a hearing officer to consider,
among other things, whether the area in question is suffering from excessive
declines in surface flows of groundwater levels, from a decline in water quality,
or from a situation where groundwater withdrawals exceed recharge. 145 If the
hearing officer finds that any such conditions exist, then the Chief Engineer sets a
second public hearing to consider the merits of the LEMA plan and whether it
should be adopted. 146
At the second public hearing (or hearings), there is an important difference
from the IGUCA process: the scope of the hearing is limited to the plan put up by
the sponsoring GMD. 147 The Chief Engineer is thus statutorily prohibited from
considering alternative LEMA plans. The plan in question may not be
substantively amended, limiting uncertainty and potential changes offered by
outside parties or the state. The only question before the Chief Engineer at this
stage is whether to accept the proposed plan. Based on the evidence submitted at
the hearings, the Chief Engineer can accept the plan as proposed, reject it, send it
back to the GMD for revisions and resubmission; if he decides that it passes
muster, then he issues an order of designation setting forth the local enhanced
management plan in detail. 148 As an order of the Chief Engineer, enforcement of
the plan falls to KDA-DWR, and not to the GMD, thus taking the onus of
enforcement off of the local groundwater interests who (somewhat paradoxically)

142. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-1041(a) (2020).
143. See, e.g., Letter from David W. Barfield, Chief Engineer, Division of Water Resources, to Darrell
Wood, President, Big Bend Groundwater Management District No. 5 (July 30, 2019) (responding to the KDADWR’s response to the 2019 LEMA proposal made by the Big Bend Groundwater Management District No. 5),
https://agriculture.ks.gov/docs/default-source/dwr-water-appropriation-documents/2019-0730formalresponsetofeb2019lema_request.pdf?sfvrsn=e5d688c1_0 (on file with the University of the Pacific
Law Review).
144. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-1041(a).
145. Id. §§ 82a-1041(b), 82a-1036.
146. Id. § 82a-1041(e).
147. Id. § 82a-1041(c).
148. Id. §§ 82a-1041(d)–(f).
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championed “local control” in the first place. 149 The order is subject to both
administrative and judicial review under Kansas administrative law. 150
In short, the LEMA statute combines local control over the groundwater
management plan with the central enforcement authority held by KDA-DWR
over the administration of water rights and IGUCAs. As we will see in Part III of
this Article, this combination has produced meaningful groundwater conservation
across western Kansas.
IV. LEMAS IN KANSAS
Since 2013, the Chief Engineer has approved three LEMAs. The LEMA
concept has attracted national attention as a means to achieve meaningful
groundwater conservation without running afoul of the legal protections afforded
to the western groundwater right. 151 Section A of this Part distills the three
approved LEMA plans into eight principal features. Section B surveys the most
notable legal, economic, and hydrological findings based on analyses of the
LEMAs so far.
A. A Distillation of the Relevant LEMA Features
The three LEMAS are located in northwest and western Kansas. In 2012,
Northwest Kansas Groundwater Management District No. 4 (“GMD4”)
submitted the first LEMA plan to KDA-DWR for the Sheridan-6 “High Priority
Area,” a designation for areas facing severe groundwater declines. The Chief
Engineer approved the Sheridan-6 LEMA in 2013; it consists of ninety-nine
sections across six townships in Sheridan and Thomas Counties. 152 The Sheridan6 LEMA was renewed in 2017 for another five-year period, and its management
programs are almost identical to its predecessor. 153 The success of the Sheridan-6
LEMA led to GMD4 securing the Chief Engineer’s approval of a second one,
149. Id. §§ 82a-1041(h), 82a-1901. However, the Chief Engineer may delegate enforcement authority to
the GMD. Id. § 82a-1041(f).
150. Id.
151. See, e.g., Sip It Slowly: Farmers in Kansas Are Starting to Adapt to Declining Stocks of
Groundwater, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 28, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21586874farmers-kansas-are-starting-adapt-declining-stocks-groundwater-sip-it-slowly (on file with the University of the
Pacific Law Review); Laura Parker, What Happens to the U.S. Midwest When the Water’s Gone?, NATIONAL
GEOGRAPHIC (Aug. 2016), http://www.nationalgeographic.com/magazine/2016/08/vanishing-midwest-ogallalaaquifer-drought/.
152. Sheridan 6 Local Enhanced Mgmt. Area, 12-Water-8366, at 24–25, 28–29 (2013) (Order of
Designation Approving the Sheridan 6 Local Enhanced Management Area within Groundwater Management
District No. 4) [hereinafter 2013 GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA]. The author represented the Chief Engineer in this
matter.
153. Sheridan 6 Local Enhanced Mgmt. Area in Sheridan and Thomas Ctys., Kan., 001-DWR-LEMA2017, at 5 (2017) (Order of Designation Regarding the Sheridan 6 Local Enhanced Management Plan for 20182022) [hereinafter 2017 GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA].
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across the entire district, in 2018; it comprises ninety-five townships across the
ten counties included within the district’s boundaries. 154 And late in 2020,
Western Kansas Groundwater Management District No. 1 (“GMD1”) secured the
Chief Engineer’s approval of a LEMA for the sixteen townships of Wichita
County that are within the boundaries of GMD1. 155 An earlier effort by GMD1 to
establish a district-wide LEMA failed by a narrow vote within the GMD, and did
not proceed to the hearing stage.
A review of the groundwater management plans approved for these three
LEMAs reveals eight relevant features, which for the most part are reasonably
consistent. What follows is a distillation of these features.
1. Pumping Goals During the LEMA Period
Each of the plans begins with a goal establishing the maximum amount of
total groundwater to be pumped within the LEMA during a five-year period. The
2013 Sheridan-6 LEMA set a goal of restricting all non-domestic groundwater
pumping to no more than 114,000 acre-feet for the five irrigation seasons
between 2013 and 2017, a reduction designed to reduce pumping by 20%
compared to historic pumping levels. 156 Its 2017 successor increased that total to
117,600 acre-feet for 2018–2022, because 3,600 acres that had been enrolled in
federal conservation programs during the first Sheridan-6 LEMA period had
come out of those programs and were irrigating again. 157 The GMD4 DistrictWide LEMA of 2018 limits total groundwater withdrawals for all appropriation
rights to 1.7 million acre-feet for the 2018–2022 LEMA period. 158 As discussed
below in subsection 5, this LEMA excludes vested or pre-1945 rights from
regulation. The 2020 GMD1 LEMA sets a five-year limit on irrigation
withdrawals of 246,883 acre-feet, a reduction designed to reduce pumping by
15% compared to historic pumping levels. 159
All of the LEMAs established so far are temporary and share a five-year
duration. 160 There is no requirement in the LEMA statute for a LEMA to be

154. Groundwater Management District No. 4 District Wide Local Enhanced Mgmt. Area in Cheyenne,
Decatur, Gove, Graham, Logan Rawlins, Sheridan, Sherman, Thomas, and Wallace Ctys., Kan., 002-DWRLEMA-2017, at 35–37 (2018) [hereinafter 2018 GMD4 District-Wide LEMA].
155. Wichita County Local Enhanced Mgmt. Area in Wichita Cty., Kan., 001-DWR-LEMA-2020,
Exhibit A, at 3 (2020) (Order of Decision Accepting the Management Plan for the Wichita County Local
Enhanced Management Area) [hereinafter 2020 GMD1 LEMA].
156. 2013 GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA, supra note 149, at 25, 29.
157. 2017 GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA, supra note 150, at 6–7. These programs include the Environmental
Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) and the Agricultural Water Enhancement Program (AWEP), both sponsored
by the Natural Resources Conservation Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture.
158. 2018 GMD4 District-Wide LEMA, supra note 151, at 42.
159. 2020 GMD1 LEMA, supra note 152, Exhibit A, at 2.
160. 2020 GMD1 LEMA, supra note 152, Exhibit A, at 2; 2018 GMD4 District-Wide LEMA, supra note
151, at 43; 2013 GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA, supra note 149, at 29; 2017 GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA, supra note
150, at 8.
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permanent, temporary, or of any particular duration. The statute requires that the
local enhanced management plan be substantial, and KDA-DWR has accepted
these five-year plans as meeting that threshold requirement. 161 The irrigators who
developed these plans did not want to commit to permanent reductions. Instead,
as described in subsection 8 below, the plans share an expectation that if they are
successful, then they should be renewed for a successive five-year period, as the
Sheridan-6 LEMA has been.
2. Prior Appropriation Rights
The most important doctrinal aspect of the LEMA plans is that they almost
completely disregard the priority system in setting individual pumping
allocations. In both generations of the Sheridan-6 LEMA, all irrigation rights are
reduced regardless of priority. 162 The 2018 GMD4 District-Wide LEMA and the
2020 GMD1 LEMA reduce all appropriation rights (defined in the KWAA as
post-1945 rights 163) regardless of priority. 164 But these two LEMAs have
exceptions for vested rights, which the KWAA defines as pre-1945 rights
subsequently recognized under its statutory procedures. 165 This division into preand post-1945 rights is not as important as it first appears largely because few
large groundwater irrigation rights were developed in western Kansas prior to the
enactment of the KWAA. The issue of vested rights is discussed below in
subsection 5.
However, the LEMA plans do not disregard priority in protecting individual
water rights. In times of water shortage, an owner is entitled to the protections of
priority if the Chief Engineer determines that her right is being impaired by other
rights. 166 The LEMA plans expressly maintain that entitlement, but recommend
to the Chief Engineer that he consider the requirements of the plan in resolving
the impairment matter. 167 These are sensible requests, because the Kansas
regulations have distinct procedures for situations involving discrete well-to-well
impairment 168 and for those involving a regional decline in aquifer levels. 169 The
latter situation is the general motivation for the LEMAs in the first place. Thus,

161. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-1041(a) (2020).
162. 2017 GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA, supra note 150, at 12; 2013 GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA, supra note
149, at 29.
163. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-701(e).
164. 2020 GMD1 LEMA, supra note 152, at 4, and Exhibit A, at 3; 2018 GMD4 District-Wide LEMA,
supra note 151, at 43, and Attachment 1, 11.
165. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82a-701(d), 82a-704a.
166. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82a-706b, 82a-707(c); KAN. ADMIN. REGS. §§ 5-4-1, 5-4-1a (2020).
167. 2020 GMD1 LEMA, supra note 152, Exhibit A, at 3, 9; 2018 GMD4 District-Wide LEMA, supra
note 151, Exhibit 1, at 9; 2013 GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA, supra note 149, at 38–39.
168. KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 5-4-1.
169. KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 5-4-1a.
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the 2013 Sheridan-6 LEMA expressly provides for a water right owner to bring a
well-to-well impairment complaint; but if the Chief Engineer finds that the
impairment is the result of a regional lowering of the water table, the LEMA plan
gives the Chief Engineer latitude in determining the “appropriate resolution” of
such impairment. 170
3. Practical and Flexible Allocations During the LEMA Period
The LEMAs order the reduction of groundwater pumping according to
several practical factors. The most prevalent factor is recent pumping levels, not
the certified annual authorized quantity of the perfected water rights. Because of
over-appropriation and aquifer-wide depletion, very few groundwater rights in
western Kansas can pump the annual quantities and at the pumping rates
described in their water rights certificates. The framers of the LEMAs recognized
the obvious: meaningful reductions had to be based on recent pumping levels, not
the “paper water” described in the water rights certificates. In the 2013 GMD4
Sheridan-6 LEMA, all irrigation rights were limited to a five-year allocation of
eleven inches annually—or fifty-five inches total—for each “designated eligible
acre,” which is the appurtenant acreage for each water right actually irrigated in
either 2010, or the highest acreage irrigated between 2007 and 2010.171 The
allocation of each water right is individually quantified in the LEMA order. 172
The temporal flexibility of the allocations is a critical aspect of the LEMAs.
An irrigator in the GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA can use the fifty-five inches per
designated eligible acre however he deems appropriate over the five-year period,
provided he does not pump more than the right’s annual authorized quantity in
any given year. 173 The second-generation Sheridan-6 LEMA maintains this
allocation method but rewards conservation by allowing a five inch per acre
carryover for any unused allocation from the original’s 2013–2017 period. 174
The other two LEMAs follow this same temporal flexibility but take a
different approach to their respective five-year allocations. In the 2018 GMD4
District-Wide LEMA, pumping is limited according to the groundwater situation
within the specific township. Annual pumping amounts range from 12.9 inches
annually (for a five-year allocation of 64.5 inches) in the most-depleted
townships, to up to 18 inches annually for a five-year allocation of 90 inches in
the least-depleted ones. 175 The latter figure, while enjoyed by senior rights in
170. 2013 GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA, supra note 149, at 38–39.
171. Id. at 26, 29–30.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 32.
174. 2017 GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA, supra note 150, at 6.
175. 2018 GMD4 District-Wide LEMA, supra note 151, at 43, and Attachment 1, at 11. The attentive
reader has noticed that the 2017 GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA is wholly within the boundaries of the 2018 GMD4
District-Wide LEMA. GMD4 was alert to this issue and has resolved it by requiring that the most restrictive
allocation applies in the event of a conflict. 2017 GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA, supra note 150, at 13.
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western Kansas, is in excess of the current NIR for many of the counties in
western Kansas, and so imposes little or no reductions in pumping.176 The
baseline for the district-wide reductions is the maximum reported irrigated acres
under the individual water right between 2009 and 2015.177 There is a detailed
appeals process for challenging the determination of eligible acres. 178 No water
right is reduced more than 25% from the average historical pumping amounts of
that seven-year period, unless it would allow more than eighteen inches per acre
to be pumped. 179 Like the GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA, the district-wide LEMA
envisions its own renewal. In that case, the GMD4 board will consider allowing a
10% carryover of the LEMA’s allocations for the successive LEMA period.180
The 2020 GMD1 LEMA involves severely crippled groundwater rights, and
its method of allocation reflects that dire reality. 181 The five-year allocations
apply to all irrigation rights and to all voluntarily-enrolled vested rights. 182 The
LEMA allocations require a 14.7% reduction in water use over the five-year
period, compared to the “historical usage” of 2009–2015 pumping levels. This is
less than the 20.02% reduction estimated by the Kansas Geological Survey to be
required to stabilize groundwater levels for the next decade or two, but the 14.7%
reduction will be sufficient to extend the practical usable lifetime of the aquifer at
a saturated thickness of fifteen feet from seven to sixteen years. 183 The LEMA
applies the reduction to two classes of water rights. For the most crippled water
rights, where the “historical usage” of 2009–2015 is 20% or less of the annual
authorized quantity set forth in the individual water rights certificate, then the
five-year allocation is simply five times the historical usage. 184 No further
reductions are required of this class of water right. For less severely crippled
rights, where the historical usage is more than 20% of the rights’ annual
authorized quantities, then the five-year allocation is the greater of the following
amounts: 20% of the annual authorized quantity multiplied by five, or 75% of
historical usage multiplied by five, a “conservation factor.” 185 The 2020 GMD1
LEMA also contains detailed procedures for appealing allocations. 186 The
irrigators within the 2020 GMD1 LEMA have struck a bargain with themselves,
176. KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 5-5-12 (2020).
177. 2018 GMD4 District-Wide LEMA, supra note 151, at 45.
178. Id. 45–46.
179. Id. at 44.
180. Id.
181. Most of the aquifer within Wichita County is below the minimum saturated thickness required to
support well yields at 200 gallons per minute (gpm) under a 90-day pumping scenario with 200 gpm wells on
quarter sections. 2020 GMD1 LEMA, supra note 152, Exhibit A, Attachment F, at 20. The irrigation of corn in
western Kansas generally requires a 400 gpm well pumping over a 100-day irrigation season.
182. 2020 GMD1 LEMA, supra note 152, Exhibit A, at 4–5.
183. Id. at 8–9.
184. Id. Exhibit A, at 4.
185. Id. Exhibit A, at 1, 4.
186. Id. Exhibit A, at 9–11.
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playing for as much time as the aquifer will allow under moderate reductions in
use.
4. Flexibility of Water Usage Across Water Rights and Appurtenant Land
The LEMAs also permit the combination of individual groundwater rights
into one or more allocations, and allow water supplies from one right within such
an allocation to be transferred to a different point of diversion or place of use.
This is a significant deviation from the statutory and regulatory provisions of the
KWAA, which would otherwise require changes in the underlying rights to be
approved by application to the chief engineer on an individual basis and
subjected to the no-injury rule. 187 Both iterations of the GMD4 Sheridan-6
LEMA allow individual rights to be combined into a single allocation. Multiple
allocations can be combined into an irrigation allocation account, which can be
apportioned across the individual, constituent water rights’ discrete points of
diversion within that account—provided, of course, that the total allocation
account and the annual authorized quantities of its individual constituent rights
are not exceeded. 188 Irrigation allocations can be transferred to a different place
of use or point of diversion; in the event of such a transfer, GMD4 does the
accounting work—not KDA-DWR.189
The other two LEMAs have less flexible provisions for allocating multiple
rights across points of diversion and places of use. In the 2018 GMD4 DistrictWide LEMA, wells pumping to a common irrigation system or systems receive a
single allocation for the total acres irrigated by the system. 190 The 2020 GMD1
LEMA uses the term “combined well unit” to describe multiple rights diverting
water from the same source of supply and physically tied together for the
distribution of irrigation water. Wells within a combined well unit can share the
combined quantity of their individual LEMA allocations, but again, no individual
right can exceed its annual authorized quantity. 191 All such units must be enrolled
in the first year of the LEMA period (2021) and be approved by both the GMD1
board and KDA-DWR prior to their implementation. 192
It should be noted, however, that the attributes of the groundwater rights
underlying these allocations do not change. The allocations do not effect any
permanent alteration of the underlying water rights. 193 Changes to these “base

187. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-708b (2020); KAN. ADMIN. REGS. §§ 5-5-1 to 5-5-16 (2020).
188. 2017 GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA, supra note 150, at 9–10; 2013 GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA, supra
note 149, at 30–31.
189. 2013 GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA, supra note 149, at 31.
190. 2018 GMD4 District-Wide LEMA, supra note 151, at 43. Where the places of use for a common
irrigation system span two zones with different pumping allocation levels, then the total allocation is based on a
weighted average of allocations based on the irrigated acres in each zone. Id.
191. 2020 GMD1 LEMA, supra note 152, Exhibit A, at 1, 7.
192. Id.
193. Id. Exhibit A, at 4.
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water rights” must be performed according to the standard KWAA statutes and
regulations for evaluating applications to change water rights. 194 Allocations can
be increased or decreased by the purchase or sale of water rights. 195
5. Preferential Treatment of Vested and Non-irrigation Rights
Irrigation use accounts for almost all water pumped across the LEMAs.196
That has allowed the GMDs to include preferential treatments for smaller, nonirrigation uses, reducing their allocations by lesser amounts or not reducing them
at all. In both iterations of the GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA, stockwatering rights
were reduced by 20% for their respective five-year allocations. 197 Because
irrigators sell much of their corn and grain sorghum to local feedlots, the
preferential treatment for stockwatering rights makes sense. Recreational rights
in the Sheridan-6 LEMA suffered only a 10% reduction in their annual
authorized quantities for their five-year allocations. 198
The other two LEMAs treat vested rights and non-irrigation rights even more
favorably. In the 2020 GMD4 District-Wide LEMA, vested rights that draw from
an alluvial water supply are exempt from reductions. 199 Stockwatering uses are
“encouraged” but not required to use 90% of their allowable use under the
KWAA regulations. 200 Municipal users are similarly “encouraged” but not
required to reduce water use, and all other non-irrigation rights are urged to use
best management practices. 201 The 2020 GMD1 LEMA completely exempts
vested rights from LEMA reductions; but vested rights may voluntarily enroll in
the LEMA and thus partake of the temporal and spatial flexibility provided by
the allocations. Once enrolled, however, vested rights may not be withdrawn
during the five-year LEMA period. 202 The 2020 GMD1 LEMA does not subject
non-irrigation uses to reductions because those uses account for less than 4% of
all water usage in the area. 203 Stockwatering rights, municipal rights, industrial

194. See, e.g., 2018 GMD4 District-Wide LEMA, supra note 151, at 44.
195. 2013 GDM4 Sheridan-6 LEMA, supra note 149, at 33–34 (for stockwatering rights).
196. For example, non-irrigation rights make up approximately 7.7% of all water rights in GMD4. 2018
GMD4 District-Wide LEMA, supra note 151, at 34.
197. 2017 GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA, supra note 150, at 10 (reducing the regulatory maximum
reasonable quantity for livestock from 15 gallons per head per day as set forth in KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 5-3-22
(2017) to 12 gallons per head per day in the LEMA); 2013 GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA, supra note 149, at 33–34.
198. 2017 GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA, supra note 150, at 11; 2013 GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA, supra note
149, at 34.
199. 2020 GDM1 LEMA, supra note 152 Exhibit A, at 2.
200. 2018 GMD4 District-Wide LEMA, supra note 151, at 44. Such a reduction would limit stock uses
to 13.5 gallons per head per day, using the 15-gallon per head per day limit in KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 5-3-22
(2020).
201. 2018 GMD4 District-Wide LEMA, supra note 151, at 44.
202. 2020 GMD1 LEMA, supra note 152, Exhibit A, at 2–3, 5.
203. Id. Exhibit A, at 3, 11.
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rights, recreational rights, and domestic rights are instead encouraged to use
water more efficiently and engage in voluntary conservation measures. 204
6. Enhanced Civil Penalties for Violations
One of the most revealing characteristics of the LEMA orders is their
enhanced civil penalty provisions: the irrigators who devised the LEMAs clearly
want violators to pay a heightened price. Under the civil penalty provisions of the
KWAA, the standard monetary penalty for over-pumping is $500 per day that
over-pumping was occurring, with a maximum penalty period of twenty days and
a maximum suspension of one year of water use. 205 In cases of repeat offenses
and substantial over-pumping violations, the Chief Engineer has discretion to
impose more severe penalties up to $1,000 per day, reductions in future pumping
equal to twice the amount of water over-pumped (but not to exceed the annual
authorized quantity of the right), and up to five-year suspensions of the water
right. 206 However, the regulations contain numerous mitigating factors, such as
the absence of gross negligence or intentional noncompliance, or the prompt
correction of the violation upon KDA-DWR’s notification of the violation. These
make such harsh penalties a rarity. 207
By contrast, the civil penalty provisions for most of the LEMAs are stiffer
and leave no room for the Chief Engineer’s discretion. In the GMD4 Sheridan-6
LEMA, exceeding the annual authorized quantity of any single water right shall
result in a $1,000 fine, and exceeding any allocation quantity by less than four
acre-feet during the five-year LEMA period shall result in a $1,000 fine for every
day pumping was taking place in excess of the allocation. 208 Any violation in
excess of four acre-feet results in an automatic two-year suspension of the water
right and to all rights in a combined allocation account—effectively putting the
owner out of the irrigation business for two years. 209 Other civil penalties are
expressly made available under the KWAA. 210 Finally, there is the locals’ duty to
snitch: if GMD4 learns of any violation of the LEMA order, it has the express
obligation to report the violation to KDA-DWR and to assist KDA-DWR.211
These civil penalty provisions were renewed in the second generation of the
Sheridan-6 LEMA. 212 The 2018 GMD4 District-Wide LEMA contains similar
penalties and allows fines up to $10,000 for exceeding the allocation limits. 213
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id. Exhibit A, at 6–7.
KAN. ADMIN. REGS. §§ 5-14-10(e), 5-14-10(m) (2020).
Id. § 5-14-12(e).
Id. § 5-14-12(f).
2013 GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA, supra note 149, 37–38.
Id. at 38.
Id. (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-737 (2013)).
Id.
2017 GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA, supra note 150, at 11.
2018 GMD4 District-Wide LEMA, supra note 151, at 47.

527

2021 / High Plains Lessons for California’s Sustainable Groundwater
Management Act
The 2020 GMD1 LEMA is the only LEMA which does not impose a stricter civil
penalty regime than that of the KWAA. 214
7. Monitoring, Water Use Reporting, and Meter Tampering Burdens
The heightened civil penalty provisions of the LEMAs accompany increased
groundwater monitoring, more extensive water use reporting requirements, and a
significant change in the evidentiary burdens concerning insufficient meter
information. They require additional monitoring wells, some of which are
equipped with a continuous pressure transducer to enable hourly measurements.
The GMDs operate and maintain these wells and cooperate with KDA-DWR in
obtaining and analyzing the meter data. 215 Irrigators in the GMD4 Sheridan-6
LEMA as well as the 2018 GMD4 District-Wide LEMA must report their water
use more frequently, as often as every two weeks; these requirements are in
addition to the annual water use requirements imposed by the KWAA.216
A perhaps more telling feature is how the LEMAs deal with the possibility of
meter tampering. In both the GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA and the 2020 GMD1
LEMAs, if either the GMD or KDA-DWR questions the meter readings, and the
irrigator does not provide pumping records, then the water right shall be
presumed to have diverted its full annual authorized quantity for the year in
which the GMD requested the well record. Any issues regarding meter
inaccuracy lead to the same presumption. 217 The 2018 GMD4 District-Wide
LEMA goes even further. If the GMD learns of any meter tampering or other
meter-related dishonesty, then the GMD board shall recommend a five-year
suspension of the water right, and further, that it be stripped of its remaining
assigned allocation quantities. 218 The change in the presumption means that
neither KDA-DWR nor the GMD needs to prove that the records and meters
under review have been doctored. Clearly, the irrigators want the strongest
penalties possible for such violations. 219 But because LEMAs are established by
order of the Chief Engineer, only KDA-DWR has actual enforcement and civil
penalty authority. Thus, the GMDs and KDA-DWR cooperate in water use
accounting. 220
214. 2020 GMD1 LEMA, supra note 152, Exhibit A, at 7.
215. 2020 GMD1 LEMA, supra note 152, Exhibit A, at 7; 2017 GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA, supra note
150, at 11-12; 2013 GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA, supra note 149, at 39–40.
216. 2018 GMD4 District-Wide LEMA, supra note 151, 47–48; 2013 GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA, supra
note 149, 34–35.
217. 2013 GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA, supra note 149, 34–35.
218. 2018 GMD4 District-Wide LEMA, supra note 151, at 47.
219. At one meeting in Hoxie, Kansas, in 2011 in which the author was present in his professional
capacity representing the Chief Engineer, irrigators proposed that pumping and metering violations of LEMA
orders be classified as felonies, and wrongdoers punished accordingly—provided that they first receive a fair
trial. Sadly, this proposal did not gain traction in the legislature.
220. 2018 GMD4 District-Wide LEMA, supra note 151, at 49; 2013 GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA, supra
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8. Annual Reviews and Reviews for LEMA Renewals
Finally, all of the LEMAs establish committees and procedures to review the
operations of the individual LEMA, both on an annual basis and with the longerterm goal of renewing the LEMA for a successive period. The committees
consist of irrigators within each LEMA as well as representatives from KDADWR. 221 They conduct annual reviews and produce annual reports covering the
following required subjects: water use data; groundwater level information;
economic data; whether the allocations of individual rights have concentrated or
distorted the geographic distribution of diversions and water use within the
LEMA; violations and meter-data issues related to violations; enforcement
issues; new and enhanced groundwater management options; and any
recommended modifications to the existing LEMA order. 222 The metering
provisions of the LEMA orders are a specific subject of annual reviews; if the
committee deems them to be ineffective, then it shall recommend changes to the
Chief Engineer. 223
The most important review issue is probably that of whether to renew the
LEMA for a successive period. Each of the LEMAs provide for such a formal
review to be performed in the last year or eighteen months of the LEMA under
review. The review covers the same subjects as those in the annual reviews but
considers the overall impacts of the LEMA. The most important of these impacts
are as follows: the economic impacts of the pumping reductions; changes in
water levels and changes in their rate of decline; whether the increased flexibility
afforded by the LEMA allocations substantially increased water use in the
LEMA, or raised other concerns; and the impact of the LEMA on the “local
public interest.” 224 The ultimate matters of consideration are whether to extend
the LEMA for another period, whether to expand the boundaries of the LEMA,
and whether to consider any additional LEMA plans for the future. 225
B. Early Legal, Economic, and Hydrological Findings Concerning LEMAs
Since the first LEMA was established in 2013, the LEMA approach to
groundwater conservation has gained the attention of water experts working
across several professional disciplines. Because all owners of non-domestic
note 149, at 36–37.
221. 2017 Sheridan-6 LEMA, at 12; 2018 GMD4 District Wide LEMA, supra note 151, at 49; 2013
GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA, supra note 149, at 41.
222. 2020 GMD1 LEMA, supra note 152, Exhibit A, at 8; 2018 GMD4 District-Wide LEMA, supra note
151, at 49–50; 2013 GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA, supra note 149, at 41–42.
223. 2020 GMD1 LEMA, supra note 152, Exhibit A, at 8; 2013 GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA, supra note
149, at 36.
224. 2020 GMD1 LEMA, supra note 152, Exhibit A, at 8, 2018 GMD4 District-Wide LEMA, supra note
151, at 50; 2013 GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA, supra note 149, at 42.
225. 2020 GMD1 LEMA, supra note 152, Exhibit A, at 9; 2018 GMD4 District-Wide LEMA, supra note
151, at 50; 2013 GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA, supra note 149, at 42.
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Kansas water rights must report their annual diversion amounts and acreages, and
because KDA-DWR and the Kansas Geological Survey operate an extensive
statewide network of groundwater monitoring wells, Kansas enjoys an unusually
rich record of water data. This data has enabled economists and scientists to
reach confident conclusions about the specific impacts of LEMA-style
groundwater management.
But first, there are the legal issues: for a LEMA to exist, it must withstand
legal challenges. Because the IGUCA and LEMA statutes allow the Chief
Engineer to order reductions in groundwater pumping across groundwater rights
within the subject area, the establishment of such areas has provoked some
predictable but so far unsuccessful legal challenges. 226 Neither generation of the
Sheridan-6 LEMA was challenged, nor was the 2020 GMD1 LEMA.227
However, a group of irrigators within GMD4 raised a substantial legal challenge
to the 2018 GMD4 District-Wide LEMA. 228 While they lost their case and did
not appeal, two aspects of their challenge—and KDA-DWR’s response—merit
comment.
One aspect concerns that of the prior appropriation doctrine. The plaintiffs
alleged that the LEMA statute, as well as the establishment of the 2018 GMD4
District-Wide LEMA, violated the KWAA by impermissibly deviating from the
prior appropriation doctrine that the KWAA codifies. As set forth above, the
LEMA statute does not require the corrective control provisions of a LEMA to be
imposed upon groundwater rights according to strict priority; rather, it contains a
precatory recommendation that priority be followed “insofar as may be
reasonably done.” 229 Based on the LEMA statute’s language, the district court
easily disposed of the plaintiffs’ prior appropriation argument: “Had the
Legislature meant for the prior appropriation doctrine to apply to LEMAs and
IGUCAs then there would have been mention of it within the statute. Instead, the
Legislature authorized the corrective controls that directly and unambiguously
contravene the prior appropriation doctrine.” 230 The district court similarly
dismissed the plaintiffs’ argument that the preferential treatment of non-irrigation
uses violated the KWAA’s use-blind prior appropriation provisions. It found that
such treatment was reasonable based on the fact that non-irrigation uses
constituted a tiny fraction of overall water use in GMD4.231
A second aspect concerns takings. The plaintiffs argued that the GMD4
226. For potential legal challenges to IGUCAs, see Peck, supra note 123, at 504–06.
227. See 2017 GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA, supra note 150, at 5.
228. Friesen v. Barfield, No. 2018-CV-000010, (Gove Cty., Kan. Dist. Court Oct. 15, 2019). The
decision
is
available
at
https://agriculture.ks.gov/docs/default-source/dwr-water-appropriationdocuments/friesen-memorandum-decision-101519.pdf?sfvrsn=7bfd89c1_0 (on file with the University of the
Pacific Law Review).
229. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-1041(f)(2) (2020).
230. Friesen, No. 2018-CV-000010, at 24.
231. Id. at 16.
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District-Wide LEMA plan committed takings because it retroactively reduced
vested groundwater rights and constituted a regulatory taking of both vested and
appropriation rights. 232 The district court rejected these arguments, based on the
court’s characterization of the property rights under review and according to
Kansas’s version of the Penn Central test. 233 Because the LEMA plan was
temporary, the underlying water rights subject to the five-year corrective control
provisions had not been subject to an impermissible taking—apparently
suggesting that only a permanent reduction would raise constitutional
concerns. 234 The court similarly emphasized that the “character of the
governmental action” under Penn Central and its Kansas progeny was to
promote the public “common good” of regional groundwater conservation. 235 In
fact, the court noted that the plaintiffs “may even gain an economic benefit from
the reduced water usage” imposed by the LEMA. 236
These two aspects of the decision are not controversial. Yet KDA-DWR, for
understandable reasons, has apparently developed a sensitivity to the plaintiffs’
legal arguments. In responding to the allegation that LEMAs might run afoul of
the prior appropriation doctrine, the Chief Engineer has emphasized how the
LEMA orders have upheld and maintained the doctrine by expressly allowing for
senior rights to bring impairment actions against junior rights, and by noting that
the “base water rights”—and their attendant priorities—remain unaffected by
LEMA allocations. That includes impairment actions brought against junior uses
that are subject to smaller reductions in their allocations because their economic
value is greater than that of irrigation use. 237
Next, the plaintiffs’ takings arguments may help explain why all of the
LEMA orders establish temporary, five-year management plans, as the GMDs
intended. Reductions in water use dictated by the prior appropriation doctrine
raise no takings issues: an express condition of a prior appropriation right is its
priority, which entitles the owner to divert water when it is available in excess of
prior rights. 238 But LEMA plans apply their pumping reductions without regard
to priority, leaving that classic takings defense unavailable. 239 This largely
explains why, but also how, KDA-DWR has stressed that takings fears are
“unfounded”: because the five-year allocations do not permanently change the
underlying water rights, they do not limit the amount of water that can be

232. Id. at 16–17.
233. Frick v. City of Salina, 290 Kan. 869 (2010).
234. Friesen, No. 2018-CV-000010, at 17. The court supplied no authority for the proposition that only
permanent changes can effect a regulatory takings.
235. Id. at 18–19.
236. Id. at 18.
237. 2018 GMD4 District-Wide LEMA, supra note 151, at 34 ([i]n the case of an impairment, priority
administration would be applied and the type of use would not be considered.”); see also supra text
accompanying notes 163–67.
238. E.g., Kobobel v. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 249 P.2d 1127 (Colo. 2011).
239. See supra text accompanying notes 159–61.
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pumped in any single year (within the annual authorized quantity of the right),
and they will be evaluated at the end of the five-year period to determine whether
they should be continued. 240
Moving from law to economics, early findings show that the LEMAs have
allowed groundwater irrigators to achieve substantial reductions in groundwater
pumping without suffering substantial decreases in their revenue. A five-year
study commissioned to evaluate the economic impacts of the first-generation
GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA produced promising results. 241 It compared water
usage, cropping practices, and economic outcomes for the LEMA with nearby
irrigated acreage outside the LEMA’s boundaries. Irrigators within the Sheridan6 LEMA reduced their total groundwater use by over 23%, reduced their average
groundwater use per acre by 16%, and reduced their irrigated crop acreage by
10.9%.242 Economic data supplied by the irrigators “suggests that producers
within the LEMA boundary have been able to reduce groundwater use with
minimal impact on cash flow.” 243 These findings are consistent with an earlier
study of the Walnut Creek IGUCA, which found that irrigators were able to
mitigate their initial losses by growing higher-value crops and improving their
water-use efficiencies. 244 The Sheridan-6 LEMA study’s interim findings played
an important role in the renewal of the LEMA in 2017. 245 One of the renewal
order’s findings of fact noted that the first-generation LEMA was “effective,”
producing a significant decrease in the rate of decline of the aquifer, and thus
extending its practical life but without causing a significant decrease in
profitability to irrigators. 246 Moreover, it should be noted that neither the Walnut
Creek IGUCA study nor the Sheridan-6 LEMA study evaluated an important
factor: how the conservation of groundwater supplies has protected the value of
the irrigated land.
Most importantly, there is the groundwater supply itself. Hydrological
analyses of the Sheridan-6 LEMA have revealed the conservation potential of
LEMAs. Hydrogeologists studying the GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA since 2013
have produced several research articles using pumping and water-level data to
assess the impact of its required pumping reductions. In the first study, factoring
240. 2018 GMD4 District-Wide LEMA, supra note 151, at 34.
241. Bill Golden, Monitoring the Impacts of Sheridan County 6 Local Enhanced Management Area,
Final
Report
for
2013-2017,
KAN.
ST.
U.
(Nov.
15,
2018),
https://www.agmanager.info/sites/default/files/pdf/SheridanCounty6_LEMA_2013-2017.pdf (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review).
242. Id. at 7.
243. Id.
244. Bill B. Golden & John C. Leatherman, Impact Analysis of the Walnut Creek Intensive Groundwater
Use Control Area, 47 J. REGIONAL ANALYSIS & POL’Y 176 (2017).
245. Bill Golden & Kellen Liebsch, Monitoring the Impacts of Sheridan County 6 Local Enhanced
Management Area, Interim Report for 2013-2016, CIRCLE OF BLUE (2017), https://circleofblue.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/03/Sheridan6LEMAstudy.pdf (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
246. 2017 GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA, supra note 150, at 7.
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in the impact of climatic conditions on pumping, they found that the average
annual groundwater pumping in the LEMA has been reduced by about 29%, and
the rate of water-level decline by about 67%. 247 The study also found that
“practically feasible” reductions of 10%–20% can have a larger impact on waterlevel decline rates than was previously known. Larger reductions of 20%–30%
would stabilize water levels in that area of northwest Kansas for the next decade
or two. 248 This work shows that modest reductions in annual pumping can have a
large impact on rates of groundwater decline, extending by more than a
proportionate amount the duration of a typical HPA water right thanks to longterm recharge from irrigation return flows that have previously gone
unrecognized. 249
A second, 2019 study of the Sheridan-6 LEMA made similarly promising
conclusions. It found that the LEMA surpassed its stated goals for reduced water
use, conserving enough water within the local aquifer to provide over 1.4 years’
worth of historic water needs. Yet irrigators made only minor adjustments to total
irrigated acres to meet the mandated pumping reductions; instead, they employed
more efficient water management and grew less water-intensive crops.250
Moreover, farmers were apparently able to maintain their pre-LEMA net profit
levels, despite lower yields due to reduced input and energy costs. 251 A 2020
study largely reaffirms these results. 252
V. HIGH PLAINS LESSONS FOR THE CENTRAL VALLEY
A. The Appropriateness of the Comparison
What can California learn from the Kansas LEMA experience so far? Having
reviewed the states’ distinct legal regimes for groundwater in Part II, and having
dissected the LEMA plans in Part III, the differences but especially the
similarities between the two states become more visible.
Obviously, there are distinct differences in hydrology, doctrine, and
jurisdiction. SGMA requires the sustainability that it defines, while the LEMAs
the Kansas Chief Engineer has so far approved are limited to non-renewable,
substantially depleted portions of the High Plains-Ogallala Aquifer. Unlike

247. James J. Butler, Jr., Donald O. Whittemore, B. Brownie Wilson & Geoffrey C. Bohling,
Sustainability of Aquifers Supporting Irrigated Agriculture: A Case Study of the High Plains Aquifer in Kansas,
43 WATER INT’L 815, 818–21 (2018).
248. Id. at 825.
249. Id. at 819–25.
250. Jillian M. Deines, Anthony D. Kendall, James J. Butler & David W. Hyndman, Quantifying
Irrigation Adaptation Strategies in Response to Stakeholder-Driven Groundwater Management in the US High
Plains Aquifer, ENVTL. RES. LETTERS, Apr. 2019.
251. Id. at 9.
252. J. J. Butler Jr., G.C. Bohling, D. O. Whittemore & B. B. Wilson, Charting Pathways Toward
Sustainability for Aquifers Supporting Irrigated Agriculture, 56 WATER RESOURCES RES., OCT. 2020.
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California, LEMAs exist within a prior appropriation system in which senior
rights holders can bring impairment actions according to that doctrine, and the
LEMA plans explicitly allow for such actions. And unlike SGMA mandates,
Kansas LEMAs are voluntary initiatives.
But these distinctions are not disqualifying; indeed, the similarities between
the states’ groundwater situations are ultimately more compelling. First, the
LEMA management tool also applies to renewable groundwater basins where
sustainable management is possible—and where sustainable management will
likely be required. The most pressing example is in west-central Kansas, where
groundwater pumping has impaired the senior surface-water rights of the Quivira
National Wildlife Refuge, a wetland of international importance. Big Bend
Groundwater Management District No. 5 (GMD5) has proposed several
iterations of a LEMA, none of which have yet to secure the approval of the Chief
Engineer. 253 Federal law clearly mandates the sustainable management of water
supplies upon which national wildlife refuges depend, in statutory and regulatory
terms far less compromising than the lawyerly definitions found in SGMA.254
The Walnut Creek IGUCA, whose substantive statutory tools are identical to
those of a LEMA, was established to restore a groundwater basin to at least some
degree of sustainable management. 255 The showdown at Quivira will likely create
a situation quite similar to SGMA. Pumpers will likely pursue a LEMA plan
establishing proportional pumping levels to save them from the draconian
application of the prior appropriation doctrine; and federal law will likely require
that plan to achieve sustainability.
Moreover, neither SGMA nor the Kansas LEMAs insist upon strict
adherence to rigid water law doctrine. As described in Part II, California’s
groundwater experience has embraced a multitude of doctrinal approaches. Since
Katz, California’s doctrine of correlative rights has recognized proportional rights
for overlying landowners; however, it has also recognized both appropriative and
prescriptive rights for off-tract users. 256 Overlying landowners have long been
able to pursue an impairment action against the unreasonable and inequitable
pumping of their neighbors, pursuant to Katz and its progeny; they just cannot

253. See supra text accompanying notes 132 and 141.
254. See, e.g., National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act, 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(4)(B) (2020)
(requiring the maintenance of “biological integrity, diversity, and environmental health” of the National
Wildlife Refuge System); Policy on Maintaining the Biological Integrity, Diversity, and Environmental Health
of the National Wildlife Refuge System, 66 Fed. Reg. 3,810, 3,818 (Jan. 16, 2001) (defining “environmental
health” as that term is used in 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(4)(B) to mean the “[c]omposition, structure, and
functioning of soil, water, air, and other abiotic features comparable with historic conditions”); and id. (defining
“historic conditions” to mean “[c]omposition, structure, and functioning of ecosystems resulting from natural
processes that [the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service] believe[s], based on sound professional judgment, were
present prior to substantial human related changes to the landscape.”). For the compromised language of
sustainability in the SGMA, see supra text accompanying notes 75–76.
255. See supra text accompanying notes 123–25, 145–46.
256. See supra text accompanying notes 20–25.
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pursue the action under the prior appropriation doctrine. 257 California’s
groundwater adjudications have produced a wide spectrum of doctrinal
approaches to groundwater allocation. 258 SGMA recognizes this relatively irenic
embrace by avoiding any commentary on or commitment to property rights in
groundwater. 259 In Kansas, the IGUCA and LEMA statutes substantially
compromise the prior appropriation doctrine, allowing for the same pumping
reductions across hundreds of groundwater rights with discrete priorities. 260
Priority of right is simply not a management priority in these areas. Local
irrigators could have made it so, but they have not. Likewise, the LEMA plans
contain prominent use preferences, privileging the type of use made of water
over the water right’s temporal priority. 261
Finally, there are clean parallels between the states’ procedural approaches.
The California GSA operates much as a Kansas GMD does: it authors a GSP, as
the Kansas GMD authors a LEMA plan. The state reviews the local plan: in
California, DWR and the SWRCB review the local GSA’s GSP; and in Kansas,
the Chief Engineer of KDA-DWR reviews the LEMA plan. Where the state finds
the local plan to be deficient, it returns the plan to the local agency for
reformation and improvement.
On balance then, the comparison between groundwater conservation plans
under SGMA and those under Kansas law is more than an academic exercise.
That comparison yields three useful lessons.
B. Lesson One: Beware of Bluewashing
The first lesson is to beware of “bluewashing”—the tendency to portray
water conservation plans as hydrologically meaningful, when in fact they are
not. 262
Part III revealed significant differences in the pumping reductions required
by the three LEMA plans: the Kansas Chief Engineer has approved strong plans,
but he has also approved weak, bluewashing plans. Both generations of the
Sheridan-6 LEMA plan are strong plans: they have reduced groundwater
pumping by approximately 29%, thereby substantially reducing the rate of waterdecline level by about 67%. 263 The other plans are weak by comparison. Large
areas of the 2018 GMD4 District-Wide LEMA are subject to little or no pumping

257. Tehachapi-Cummings Cty. Water Dist. v. Armstrong, 49 Cal. App. 3d 992, 1001 (1975) (discussing
numerous cases).
258. See supra Section I.B.
259. See supra text accompanying notes 89–90.
260. See supra text accompanying notes 121, 159–62.
261. See supra text accompanying notes 195–201.
262. See, e.g., Bluewashing: Why the Bottled Water Industry’s EcoFriendly Claims Don’t Hold Water,
FOOD & WATER WATCH (Mar. 2010), http://docshare02.docshare.tips/files/2864/28640326.pdf (on file with
the University of the Pacific Law Review).
263. See supra text accompanying notes 244–49.
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reductions, belying its claim to be “district-wide.” 264 The 2020 GMD1 LEMA
claims the ambition of a 14.7% reduction in pumping, but actual reductions will
probably be significantly smaller than that figure. 265 The most crippled rights
suffer no reductions at all, and the GMD1 appeals process appears to allow
irrigators the option of reclassifying their water rights for the lower level of
groundwater reductions. 266 Nonetheless, the Chief Engineer has approved these
weak plans, apparently because they meet very modest five-year goals. 267
Yet the Chief Engineer has also denied weak plans. Since 2017, KDA-DWR
has consistently rejected successive iterations of a LEMA plan put forth by
GMD5 to address the impairment of the senior surface water right held by U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service on behalf of the Quivira National Wildlife Refuge.268
KDA-DWR has rejected these plans principally because they have yet to
recommend reductions in pumping and rely instead upon changes in irrigation
mechanics and the development of a stream augmentation project. 269
Why the disparity among LEMA plans? The first reason is hydrological. In
non-renewable groundwater basins such as GMD1, where pumping has severely
and permanently depleted the aquifer, any reductions in pumping levels that slow
the rate of decline appear to satisfy the general conditions of the LEMA statute
and thus provide sufficient grounds for approval by the Chief Engineer.270
Sometimes, the simplest explanation is the best one. The Chief Engineer does not
want to impede local groundwater conservation efforts, even if those efforts may
not achieve much over the long term.
That bureaucratic tendency provides the second reason for the disparity
among LEMA plans—the politics of groundwater jurisdiction. Groundwater
irrigation communities generally see themselves differently than surface-water
irrigation communities, and view the regulation of their water rights differently
as well. 271 Surface-water communities hold senior rights and depend on rivers
and streams that flow across different regions of a state; they often divert water
from a distant basin. 272 By contrast, groundwater irrigation communities hold

264.
265.
266.
267.

See supra text accompanying notes 172–76.
See supra text accompanying notes 178–80.
See supra text accompanying notes 181–83.
2020 GMD1 LEMA, supra note 152, at 25; 2018 GMD4 District-Wide LEMA, supra note 151, at

38.
268. See supra text accompanying note 141. The GMD5 LEMA plans have not been included in this
Article because KDA-DWR has yet to approve them; litigation over the Quivira National Wildlife Refuge (see
supra note 132) may force the substantial revision of whatever LEMA plan is ultimately approved.
269. See supra note 141.
270. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-1041(a) (2020) (referencing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-1036(a)–(d)).
271. See generally Burke W. Griggs, The Political Cultures of Irrigation and the Proxy Battles of
Interstate Water Litigation, 57 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 1 (2018).
272. See, e.g., GREGORY H. HOBBS, JR. & MICHAEL WELSH, CONFLUENCE: THE STORY OF GREELEY
WATER (2020) (describing the water-supply networks of the City of Greeley and the Northern Colorado Water
Conservancy District); PATRICIA NELSON LIMERICK WITH JASON L. HANSON, A DITCH IN TIME: THE CITY, THE
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relatively junior rights and can claim that “their” water supplies are essentially
local—and state statutes often support these claims. 273 Given the political power
of groundwater districts across the West, it is easy to see why a state water
engineer will approve local initiatives for strong groundwater conservation plans.
Regarding the GMD4 Sheridan-6 plans, the locals wanted substantial pumping
reductions, the ambition of the LEMA statute is to promote such reductions, and
the KWAA explicitly requires the Chief Engineer to conserve the state’s water
resources. 274 Approving their plan was relatively straightforward.
The harder issue arises when the local GMD puts forth a weak plan. The
locals want it sufficiently to invest in developing such a plan, but the Chief
Engineer probably has his doubts about the hydrological effectiveness of a weak
plan over the long term. In this situation, we are seeing the effective deference of
the Kansas Chief Engineer to the local GMD, both in substantive matters of
water regulation—over which only the Chief Engineer has jurisdiction—and over
procedural matters as well. Chief Engineer Earl Lewis admitted as much in
approving the weak 2020 GMD1 LEMA plan:
The LEMA statute allows groundwater management districts and their
members to control the destiny of their water use. In this case, GMD 1
submitted a request for the establishment of the WHC LEMA
Management Plan, with the goal of limiting irrigation withdrawals. GMD
1’s Board of Directors evaluated various methods and determined the
provisions within the WHC LEMA Management Plan were the best
means to achieve the stated goals. The decisions made by GMD 1’s
Board of Directors are reasonable, lawful, and appropriate and, as such,
deference should be given to their decisions. 275
This is hardly a ringing endorsement of the LEMA plan’s substantive
measures, but it is a remarkably candid statement of deference to a local
groundwater irrigation community.
Litigation may well provide a third reason for the LEMA plans’ regulatory
disparities. The 2013 GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA adopted a strong plan, but one
based on consensus: the irrigators within that 99-square mile area had
participated closely in the plan’s development and were largely committed to it.
As the manager of GMD4 stated, “[i]n the end, the consensus was that consensus
was the preferred approach.” 276 Both the proponents of the GMD4 Sheridan-6

WEST, AND WATER (2012) (describing those of Denver Water).
273. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-1020 (establishing “the right of local water users to determine
their destiny with respect to the use of groundwater insofar as it does not conflict with the basic laws and
policies of the state of Kansas”).
274. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82a-1041, 82a-706.
275. 2020 GMD1 LEMA, supra note 152, at 22.
276. 2013 GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA, supra note 149, at 14 (testimony of Mr. Wayne Bossert, Manager
of GMD4).
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LEMA and KDA-DWR were prepared for a legal challenge to the plan, but none
arose. The local consensus over the plan probably explains why its renewal in
2018 did not provoke a legal challenge as well. By contrast, the 2018 GMD4
District-Wide LEMA did provoke a legal challenge, but one that failed at the
district court level and was not appealed. 277 The much larger size of the districtwide LEMA enabled a greater number of plaintiffs to support the lawsuit—
plaintiffs who were not as closely involved in the development of the districtwide LEMA plan as their counterparts in the Sheridan-6 LEMA had been.
Moreover, the gravamen of that challenge was about the LEMA statute and less
about the specific factual findings of KDA-DWR—largely enabling the district
court to defer to the legislature and to the agency record. 278 The 2020 GMD1
LEMA did not provoke a legal challenge. While it can be difficult to discern why
the litigation dog does not bark, the relatively small size of that LEMA, together
with its relatively weak provisions, may well explain the silence. 279
The litigation in GMD5 is of a different order and has placed KDA-DWR
into a different posture. In 2016, the Chief Engineer found that junior
groundwater pumping within GMD5 was impairing the senior surface water right
at the Quivira National Wildlife Refuge. 280 Since then, GMD5 has put forth
several LEMA plans to address that impairment, all of which the Chief Engineer
has rejected, prompting an administrative challenge in 2019 that remains
pending.281 Meanwhile, in early 2021, a third-party environmental plaintiff
brought an action in federal court, alleging that federal law requires the full
protection of the refuge’s senior water right. 282 At present, then, the Chief
Engineer finds his office placed between a GMD that is hostile to a stronger
LEMA plan and an environmental plaintiff that is demanding the full restoration
of the groundwater supply upon which the refuge’s streamflows largely depend.
Either remedy—a water rights administration plan or a LEMA plan—would
require substantial and likely permanent pumping reductions. Significantly, the
environmental plaintiff’s challenge depends largely upon the chief engineer’s
277. See supra text accompanying notes 225–33.
278. Id.
279. See supra text accompanying note 152.
280. DAVID W. BARFIELD, CHIEF ENGINEER, DIVISION OF WATER RESOURCES, KANSAS DEPARTMENT
OF AGRICULTURE, FINAL REPORT OF THE CHIEF ENGINEER CONCERNING A CLAIM OF WATER RIGHT
IMPAIRMENT IN THE MATTER OF WATER RIGHT FILE NO. 7,571 OWNED AND OPERATED BY THE U.S. FISH AND
WILDLIFE SERVICE (2016), https://agriculture.ks.gov/docs/default-source/wms---impairment-reports/finalimpairment-report-quivira-20160715.pdf?sfvrsn=ad2ab8c1_4 (on file with the University of the Pacific Law
Review).
281. Quivira Nat’l Wildlife Refuge, 19 WATER 16274 (2019) (Order Denying Petition for Stay of
Proceedings and Granting Petition for Administrative Review Submitted by Big Bend Groundwater
Management District No. 5 and Notice of Prehearing Conference), https://agriculture.ks.gov/docs/defaultsource/dwr-water-appropriation-documents/20190830_19-water-16274---order-denying-petition-for-stay-andgranting-petition-for-review-and-notice-of-prehearing-conference.pdf?sfvrsn=ed4a89c1_0 (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review).
282. See supra note 141. The author represents the plaintiff in this action.
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uncontested finding of impairment. 283 This posture probably explains why he has
yet to approve a weak LEMA in GMD5. Any LEMA plan that does not address
the impairment of the wildlife refuge would contradict the chief engineer’s
impairment finding; if approved, a weak LEMA plan could expose KDA-DWR
to considerable legal peril if the court finds that the agency did not sufficiently
protect the refuge’s senior water right. Both are sound reasons for rejecting a
weak LEMA plan.
In sum, there is a structural tendency within the LEMA process, inherent
within the relationship between the Chief Engineer and the GMDs, to defer to the
local agency on matters of pumping reductions—unless there are previous
agency decisions or credible litigation threats that serve to counter such
deference. Absent such decisions and threats, the Chief Engineer will probably
approve weak, bluewashing plans.
How, then, to apply that lesson to SGMA? The architects of GSPs need to be
vigilant to three interrelated areas of the SGMA process which are vulnerable to
bluewashing. The first area concerns SGMA’s statutory sustainability mandates.
Granted, these mandates militate against some of the weaknesses that are
discernible in the LEMA plans. While the IGUCA and LEMA statutes can
remedy groundwater overdraft over the long term, unlike SGMA, they do not
require reaching a sustainability goal. 284 In California, GSAs will wrestle with
these mandates. GSAs will likely exploit SGMA’s self-referential definition of
sustainability to the fullest—something that avoids “an undesirable result,” which
in turn hinges upon whether a particular hydrological problem is “significant and
unreasonable”—taking legalistic advantage of the statutory language as well as
its meanings within the context of earlier adjudications. 285 In this regard, SGMA
promises to generate a substantial body of case law construing the precise
meaning of its arguably precatory language.
But there will be a limit to how far that language can be exploited. In several
important situations, federal environmental law will likely impose clearer and
more stringent standards of groundwater conservation. The “no jeopardy”
requirements of Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) 286 and the
“take” prohibition in Section 9 of the ESA 287 provide immediate baseline
standards for SGMA’s requirement to consider the water needs of groundwaterdependent ecosystems. 288 Federal wildlife refuge law provides even clearer
standards. 289 The litigation and settlement of federal reserved water rights
claimed by Native American tribes should produce clear, long-term pumping
283. See supra note 277.
284. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82a-1036(a)-(d), 82a-1041(a) (2020); see supra text accompanying notes 122–
26.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.

CAL. WATER § 10720.1(x) (West 2020); see supra text accompanying notes 74–76.
16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2020).
16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B).
CAL. WATER § 10723.2.
See supra note 251.

539

2021 / High Plains Lessons for California’s Sustainable Groundwater
Management Act
limits on non-tribal groundwater users. 290 SGMA could even enable some useful
gap-filling. Its requirements to protect against water-quality degradation and to
consider the needs of disadvantaged communities could lead GSAs to impose
pumping limits and require injection wells in order to protect against contaminant
plumes. 291
The second area where SGMA appears to be vulnerable to bluewashing is
that of procedure. Given the structure of SGMA, it may seem simple enough to
achieve sustainable long-term management of groundwater: if the GSA proposes
a deficient plan, the SWRCB can simply intervene and impose one of its own.292
Woe to the naïve bureaucrat who reads SGMA that way. The Kansas
groundwater experience shows how centrally imposed groundwater management
plans are politically unpalatable—to the point of becoming practically
impossible. The Chief Engineer has long had the power to impose IGUCA plans
on his own initiative, but he has not done so.293 SGMA recognizes this political
reality in its structure, just as the LEMA statute does; indeed, that is the
distinctive characteristic of the latter. 294 With that reality in mind, it seems highly
implausible that the SWRCB will be intervening with supervening GSPs. Much
more probable is an iterative process through which the SWRCB and the GSA
work together to reform GSPs into a satisfactory state. That is what has occurred
with the Kansas LEMAs: for all the GMDs’ procedural autonomy over the
management plan, and their common-enough antipathy to KDA-DWR, they have
nonetheless relied heavily upon the expertise of the state. 295 SGMA clearly
provides for similar state assistance. 296 The GSAs want their GSPs to be
approved, and the SWRCB wants SGMA to succeed. Deference to local
management pervades the politics of groundwater jurisdiction.
Therein, however, lies a serious hydrological danger. Neither the state nor
the local GSA will likely insist upon pumping reductions and limitations
necessary to protect the subject groundwater basin as a functioning hydrological
system. This is the third and most worrisome area where the SGMA process is
vulnerable to bluewashing—the closed basin problem. 297
The closed basin problem exists across the West. Under pre-development
conditions, both surface water and groundwater basins transmit water supplies by

290. E.g., Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella Valley Water Dist., 849 F.3d 1262 (9th
Cir. 2017) (holding that the federal reserved water rights doctrine for Native American tribes applies to
groundwater supplies); CAL. WATER § 10732.2.
291. CAL. WATER §§ 10721(x)(4), 10732.2.
292. See supra text accompanying notes 86–87.
293. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-1036 (2020); see supra text accompanying notes 127, 129-32.
294. See supra text accompanying notes 145–46.
295. See, e.g., 2020 GMD1 LEMA, supra note 152, at 8–9, 14–15 (relying upon the Kansas Geological
Survey and KDA-DWR in devising and implementing the LEMA plan).
296. CAL. WATER § 10729.
297. For other critiques, see Perona, supra note 76.
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surface flows, groundwater baseflow to surface waters, and lateral subsurface
flow. These basins receive inflows and drain their outflows. Yet even moderate
amounts of groundwater pumping can lower groundwater levels, preventing the
drainage of water from these basins, effectively closing them. Water supplies that
used to flow across and through the basin are captured by pumping; most of the
formerly flowing groundwater exits the basin not through baseflow or lateral
subsurface flow, but through evapotranspiration by irrigated crops and land.
Because the dissolved solids in groundwater can no longer escape through
baseflow and lateral subsurface flow, the newly closed basins suffer increasing
concentrations of salts, arsenic, uranium, and other contaminants; the formerly
open basin turns into a “salt sink.” 298
As a consequence of this process, known as “anthropogenic basin closure,”
formerly open basins in the Central Valley such as the Tulare Lake Basin are
suffering from induced concentrations of salts similar to those found in naturallyclosed basins such as Death Valley or the Great Salt Lake. 299 A variation of this
problem is also occurring in the Arkansas River Valley of eastern Colorado and
western Kansas. There, groundwater irrigation has lowered the alluvial aquifer;
polluted irrigation return flows have percolated down to the aquifer,
concentrating geogenic heavy metals in the alluvium. In 2016, Colorado
delivered between eight and ten tons of geogenic uranium to Kansas via the
Arkansas River, and concentrated pollutants have also seeped into the High
Plains-Ogallala Aquifer, forcing the town of Kinsley, Kansas to build a reverseosmosis drinking water treatment plant. 300 Left unchecked, the closed basin
problem will inevitably render groundwater supplies unusable without expensive
desalination and other treatment—treatment that is probably not economical at
the scale necessary for large-scale irrigation.
In the abstract, the solution to the closed basin problem is simple: impose a
groundwater management regime that reopens the basin by restoring and
maintaining sufficient inflows and outflows. Such a regime would reduce
pumping to amounts necessary to maximize recharge and to maintain open,
flowing conditions. A necessary component of such a regime would likely be
aquifer storage, which would enable stable and higher groundwater levels,
helping to keep the basin open.301 But that simple—and hydrologically
necessary—solution would almost certainly require reductions in groundwater
pumping well beyond those necessary to attain the “squishy” statutory
requirements of SGMA. GSAs and the SWRCB will need to fight the long298. Richard A. Pauloo et al., Anthropogenic Basin Closure and Groundwater Salinization (ABSCAL), J.
HYDROLOGY, Feb. 2021. I would like to thank Dr. Pauloo and Professor Graham Fogg for their helpful
explanations of this phenomenon.
299. Id.
300. DONALD WHITTEMORE, KAN. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, ESTIMATED ANNUAL URANIUM LOADS IN THE
ARKANSAS RIVER ENTERING KANSAS 2012-2016, KANSAS GEOLOGICAL SURVEY OPEN-FILE REPORT NO.
2017-2 (2017).
301. Pauloo et al., supra note 295.
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established institutional tendency of considering river and groundwater basins
essentially as the sum of their discrete water rights claims under a typical safe
yield analysis. 302 SGMA’s statutory requirement to consider previously
unrecognized uses such as environmental users of groundwater is not, in itself,
sufficient. Such consideration may force the reapportionment of the safe yield of
the basin, but if that total safe yield figure does not incorporate groundwater
amounts necessary to maintain an open basin, SGMA will fail its mandate to
reverse “significant and unreasonable degraded water quality” over the long
term. 303
C. Lesson Two: Doctrine is Negotiable
The second lesson to be gleaned from the LEMA experience so far is that
water law doctrine can be fundamentally negotiable. In Kansas, negotiability has
proven to be perhaps the most important component in reaching consensus about
basin-wide reductions in groundwater pumping.
As described above in Section II.A, the LEMAs provide consistent examples
of owners modifying several of the cardinal rules of the prior appropriation
doctrine as it is codified in Kansas. They have compromised over priority.
Pumping reductions apply to all appropriation rights dedicated to irrigation
without regard to priority, but owners of senior rights can still bring impairment
claims against junior rights. 304 Instead of annual pumping limits, they have
adopted multi-year allocations to allow them greater temporal flexibility. 305 They
have accomplished substantial geographical flexibility by allowing water usage
across different points of diversion and different places of use. 306 And they have
established clear use preferences, imposing lesser (if any) pumping reductions on
higher-value uses such as stockwatering, municipal, and recreational rights than
they have upon irrigation rights. 307
Such negotiations over the prior appropriation doctrine in Kansas raise
hopeful signs for how GSAs and irrigators can negotiate across the generally
wider latitude of California’s correlative rights doctrine. SGMA neither creates,
nor determines, nor comments upon California’s common-law property rights
regime. 308 SGMA does not displace the common law. 309 But where the common
law is silent, GSPs can articulate rules. Thus, there is an opportunity within the
302. E.g., safe yield analyses performed as part of the groundwater adjudications described in supra
Section I.B.
303. CAL. WATER § 10721(x)(4) (West 2020).
304. See supra Subsection III.A.2.
305. See supra Subsection III.A.3.
306. See supra Subsection III.A.4.
307. See supra Subsection III.A.5.
308. See supra text accompanying notes 89–90.
309. Envtl. Law Found. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 26 Cal. App. 5th 844 (2018).
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SGMA process to establish creative, consensus-based, and effective descriptions
of allowable water usage without running afoul of California water law. Put
another way, SGMA provides room for the kind of “doctrinal choreography” and
practical equity that Pasadena achieved—but with statutory protections
previously unavailable under the common law. 310 Because the correlative rights
doctrine imposes fewer limitations than the prior appropriation doctrine does, the
dancing can be freer and safer.
GSAs can negotiate and modify the correlative rights doctrine pursuant to
SGMA in many of the same ways as GMDs have negotiated and modified the
prior appropriation doctrine in Kansas. First, through voluntary agreements
within a GSP, they can reach compromises over priority—in the California sense
of that term. They can adjust the relationship between overlying, correlative
rights and off-tract appropriative rights by applying the same level of pumping
reductions to both classes of rights; there need not be a hierarchy between the
classes. And just as appropriators in LEMAs retain the “backstop” ability to
bring impairment actions, overlying landowners could bring protective actions
against out-of-basin users, or make contractual arrangements allowing the latter
to keep pumping. Because overlying tract owners can raise their inchoate rights
at any time against out-of-basin appropriators, such a provision will likely
become attractive. 311
Second, GSAs will likely adopt the temporal flexibility afforded by multiyear allocations of water use and the geographical flexibility afforded by
temporary and permanent transfers within the boundaries of the GSA. SGMA
provides for both of these management tools. 312 Converting annual authorized
quantities of use into five-year allocations is a common enough approach to
dealing with groundwater overdraft in prior appropriation states. 313 Carryovers
across multi-year allocation periods could reward conservation, similar to what
has been done in the GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA.314 Like the LEMA plans,
SGMA’s carryover provision is annual but sets a five-year limit. 315 SGMA’s
provision for geographical flexibility within the GSA’s subject basin accords
with longstanding California’s correlative rights doctrine, which treats all inbasin pumpers as overlying owners. 316
Statute, however, will impose some limits on the geographical flexibility of
pumping allocations—especially § 1200. 317 In a relatively recent but pre-SGMA
310. Szeptycki et al., supra note 52, at 194.
311. Wright v. Goleta Water Dist., 174 Cal. App. 3d 74 (1985).
312. CAL. WATER § 10726.4(a)(3)–(4) (West 2020).
313. E.g., Briggs v. Golden Valley Land & Cattle Co., 97 Idaho 427, 431–32 (1976) (discussing fiveyear allocations); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-736 (2020) (allowing five-year “flex accounts” for individual
groundwater rights).
314. See supra text accompanying note 171.
315. CAL. WATER § 10726.4(a)(4).
316. E.g., Burr v. Maclay Rancho Water Co., 154 Cal. 428, (1908).
317. See supra text accompanying notes 26–35.
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case, the SWRCB secured judicial approval of the board’s updated test for
determining whether a groundwater formation qualified as a “subterranean
stream flowing through known and definite channels” or was instead classified as
“percolating groundwater.” 318 The decision was hailed as a “major step forward
toward the integration of ground and surface water rights” in California. 319
SGMA builds on that decision. Moving groundwater pumping into a geological
formation that qualifies as a “subterranean stream” would clearly run afoul of
SGMA’s call to avoid depletions of interconnected surface water. 320
Third, GSAs could craft use preferences within their GSPs. The Kansas
LEMAs either subject higher-value uses to lesser pumping reductions or none at
all. 321 Similar provisions could be tailored to address the economic diversity of
crops within the San Joaquin Valley, from lower-value crops such as hay and
alfalfa to high-value crops such as almonds. In the abstract, a use preference
seems economically rational. However, the much higher value of California
crops (and the vertically-integrated aspects of many California agribusinesses)
may reduce the appeal of a use preference. High Plains irrigators dedicate much
of their acreages to growing feed grains (corn, soybeans, and grain sorghum) for
beef and dairy cattle, hogs, and other livestock; they sell a large part of their
harvests to feedlots and other large-scale buyers such as ethanol plants. Thus, it is
in most irrigators’ self-interest to adopt LEMA provisions that protect the buyers
of their output.322 California irrigators, who focus largely on the consumer
market, do not suffer the same level of dependence on higher-value uses.
D. Lesson Three: Trustworthy Data and Data Analysis are Crucial to Promoting
a Culture of Conservation
The final and perhaps most intriguing lesson from the LEMA experience
concerns a resource that, like groundwater, is in a state of serious depletion
across the country: trust. The LEMA statute emerged because local irrigators did
not trust the procedures of the IGUCA statutes to safeguard their local
management initiatives; the LEMA statute distinguishes itself by providing such
safeguards. 323 The first LEMA, the 2013 Sheridan-6 LEMA, emerged from a

318. N. Gualala Water Co. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 139 Cal. App. 4th 1577 (2006) (approving
the four-part test to determine whether the SWRCB has jurisdiction over groundwater that flows in a subsurface
channel, as adopted in In re Garrapata Water Co., State Water Res. Control Bd. Dec. No. 1639 (June 17, 1999)).
319. TARLOCK & ROBISON, supra note 22, § 4:37, at 241.
320. CAL. WATER § 10721(x)(6).
321. See supra Subsection III.A.5.
322. See, e.g., 2020 GMD1 LEMA, supra note 152, at 12 (describing the testimony of Mr. Kyle Spencer,
Manager of GMD1, which stressed that the LEMA plan was “developed to minimize economic disruption in
Wichita County, and that stock and industrial users are common primary economic drivers that often consume
the commodities created by the irrigation water rights”).
323. See supra text accompanying notes 137, 145–47.
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shared commitment to groundwater conservation among a limited number of
irrigators who trusted each other enough to develop a serious groundwater
conservation plan, one that would affect all of their water rights equally. They
trusted the plan because it was anchored in hydrogeological data—pumping
amounts, pumping rates, and local groundwater levels—that was both publicly
available and widely trusted. Kansas has long required water-use reporting, and
imposes civil penalties for failing to report as well as misdemeanor penalties for
reporting false information. 324 Over 99% of Kansas water rights owners comply
with these requirements. 325 The development of the LEMA plans has depended
substantially upon such user-reported data, but also upon the independent well
measurements and analyses of the Kansas Geological Survey, whose work
Kansas irrigators clearly hold in high regard. 326 The orders establishing the
LEMAs have detailed and exceptional provisions for water-use reporting and
monitoring. 327 Just as importantly, they set forth different burdens and
presumptions for establishing pumping violations, and impose considerably more
severe penalties where such violations are established. 328
California groundwater irrigators are no better or worse than their Kansas
counterparts, but they occupy a much different regulatory situation, and thus
have a much different relationship with pumping and monitoring data. Because
pumping was effectively unregulated before the advent of SGMA, California
irrigators have not been required to meter or monitor their wells. In the context of
long-established non-regulation, mandatory metering and reporting requirements
can promote the suspicion among irrigators that the state is planning to curtail
pumping—a suspicion that is not necessarily unjustified. In many western states,
groundwater metering requirements are remarkably recent. 329 SGMA clearly
grants GSAs the power to require well registration, metering, and groundwater
level monitoring.330
In the meantime, hydrogeologists and other scientists have developed
sophisticated ways to otherwise measure the impacts of pumping on the San
Joaquin Valley’s groundwater systems. Unlike their data-rich colleagues in
Kansas, they lack direct pumping and water-use information. Yet scientists have
discovered impressive ways to compensate for this data drought. For example,
they have developed a combination of satellite-based interferometic synthetic
aperture radar (InSAR) and continuous global positioning systems (GPS), along
with conventional surface flow routing, precipitation, and runoff data. 331 This
324. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-732 (2020).
325. John C. Peck & Burke W. Griggs, Groundwater Law and Management: The Asia (IWMI)-Kansas
Program, 41 CREIGHTON L. REV. 315, 332 (2008).
326. E.g., 2013 GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA, supra note 149, at 12.
327. See supra Subsection III.A.7.
328. See supra Subsections III.A.6–7.
329. E.g., 1998 Idaho Sess. Laws 595, codified at IDAHO CODE § 42-701 (2020).
330. CAL. WATER §§ 10725.6, 10725.8, 10727.2 (West 2020).
331. Wesley R. Neely et al., Characterization of Groundwater Recharge and Flow in California’s San
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hybrid approach does more than estimate groundwater pumping by the rough
proxy of land subsidence. GPS-enhanced InSAR measures land surface
deformations and displacements—the geological responses to groundwater
pumping—at an impressively small land-area scale of 100 meters on a side. This
data, interpreted in tandem with conventional surface water data, has enabled
scientists to locate and describe groundwater recharge locations and lateral
groundwater flow paths. 332 This research has produced nothing less than a finely
resolved map of the seasonal groundwater dynamics of the San Joaquin Valley.
Between the new powers vested in GSAs to impose metering and monitoring
and the advanced state of remote analysis, SGMA has spurred remarkable
advancements in what California irrigators know about their individual and
collective pumping impacts. But two questions loom large. Will pumpers trust
that data and analysis—and the motives behind it? And if they do, will they
support their local GSA in imposing penalties—including, potentially, severe
ones—for those who violate the provisions of a GSP? 333
The Kansas experience may be less helpful in answering these questions.
Most importantly, LEMAs are voluntary, while GSPs are not. Proponents of the
GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA earnestly wanted the plan to succeed and recognized
the personal and institutional trust required to do so; the prospect of failure raised
the specter of shame. 334 Irrigators within a California GSA may not have the
same authorial interest or pride in their GSP as their Kansas counterparts.
Irrigators across the Central Valley will likely view SGMA essentially as stateimposed, top-down regulation, and hardly as an opportunity to find creative ways
to conserve groundwater. But they will still have strong incentives for developing
effective compliance mechanisms—most importantly, to avoid the SWRCB from
intervening to force the reformation of a GSP.335 Because California groundwater
was basically unregulated until the onset of SGMA, there is little of the
regulatory inertia that might otherwise impede the adoption of creative and
effective enforcement mechanisms.
VI. CONCLUSION
Comparisons such as the one put forth in this Article are fraught with
hazards—even within the narrow category of American groundwater
management. But they are not merely academic. Most of California’s agricultural
economy depends upon whether it can achieve the grand ambitions set forth in
Joaquin Valley from InSAR-observed Surface Deformation, WATER RESOURCES RES., Apr. 2021.
332. Id.
333. CAL. WATER §§ 10726.4, 10732.
334. 2013 GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA, supra note 149, at 24 (“[U]nless this LEMA is renewed for a
longer period, then the work and cooperation of GMD4, KGS and DWR will be largely wasted, and
remembered as little more than a gesture.”).
335. See supra text accompanying note 86.
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SGMA. The Central Valley Aquifer has at least three times the water storage
capacity than California’s entire surface reservoir storage capacity. 336 Whether
that aquifer is sustained, depleted, or destroyed will determine the Central
Valley’s future. In looking for ways to implement SGMA’s grand ambitions,
California could do worse than to look beyond its borders and linger a bit across
the High Plains of western Kansas.
As this Article has argued, there are lessons to be found there. Thanks to the
pioneering work of Elinor Ostrom, Edella Schlager, William Blomquist, and
others, we have learned that the use of common-pool groundwater resources can
be governed effectively and that effective governance displays common
principles and institutional arrangements. 337 (They have also tended to look most
often to California.) This Article has attempted to show that there is an overall,
practical similarity between the Kansas groundwater experience and what
California currently faces; there is also enough in the Kansas LEMA record so
far to attend usefully to practices. 338 Most importantly, Kansas groundwater
irrigators have achieved a workable and proactive consensus about groundwater
conservation, one that applies across their discrete, conflicting water rights and
their distinct groundwater situations. Lee Anne Fennell has memorably
articulated “Ostrom’s Law” to hold that “a resource arrangement that works in
practice can work in theory.”339 Practices that work in Kansas may work in
California, and that common effectiveness may enable us to recognize
regularities across their diverse hydrological and legal contexts. Then, perhaps, a
theory or a set of theories about locally-driven groundwater conservation
mandates will emerge, allowing us to assess which models work in which
contexts, and to “thereby dodge both misguided efforts at transplantation and
missed opportunities to tap into transferable lessons.” 340 Let us hope there is time
to do so in California. In many parts of Kansas, it is nearly too late.
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